BROTHER OR INVADERS?
HOW CRISIS-DRIVEN MIGRANTS SHAPE VOTING BEHAVIOR

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Brothers or Invaders? How Crisis-driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior

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ABSTRACT

What explains voters' negative attitudes toward immigration? Self-interested voters care about their personal economic and social circumstances. Sociotropic voters display in-group bias and perceive migrants as threats to their customs and culture. We study the electoral effects of forced internal and international migration in Colombia to provide evidence on the relative importance of these two hypotheses. We exploit the fact that migrants disproportionately locate in places with earlier settlements of people from their place of origin. In line with the sociotropic hypothesis, we find that only international migration inflows increase political participation and shift votes from left- to right-wing ideologies. Also consistent with the sociotropic hypothesis, we show that these results are not accounted for by the observed changes caused by migration inflows on socioeconomic variables.

JEL Classification: D72, F2, O15, R23.

Keywords: immigration, electoral outcomes, political economy.

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“The fear of immigration is poisoning Western politics. Donald Trump owes his job to it. Brexit would not be happening without it. Strident nationalists wield power in Italy, Hungary, Poland, and Austria, and have gained influence elsewhere.” The Economist¹

I Introduction

A growing stream of studies has documented a strong correlation between migration inflows and voter’s antipathy toward pro-migrant political views.² However, there is an ongoing debate on the mechanisms driving these effects. Studies grounded in political economy suggests that voters penalize politicians who are more welcoming to migrants if the latter displace local labor, depress wages, or engage in criminal behavior, and thus threaten their personal socioeconomic well-being.³ This hypothesis is called the *self-interest* motive, as defined by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014). Other literature grounded in political social-psychology, state that voter’s antipathy toward immigration is driven by group-related concerns about the cultural impacts of migrants, due to factors such as race, religion, language, nationality, or social norms.⁴ This hypothesis is known as the *sociotropic* motive.⁵

We study the relative empirical support of the *self-interest* and *socio-tropic* hypotheses by exploiting a unique natural experiment that took place in Colombia between 1994 and 2018. During

¹Last accessed August 30, 2018, from: <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/08/25/the-way-forward-on-immigration-to-the-west?cid1=cust/ednew/n/bl/n/2018/08/23n/owned/n/n/nwl/n/n/LA/146317/n>.

²Examples of these studies include Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008); Otto and Steinhardt (2014); Mendez and Cutillas (2014); Barone et al. (2016); Harmon (2017); Halla et al. (2017); Dustmann et al. (2019). Current examples include the rise in support for the anti-immigration *Swedish Democrats*, which increased their vote share in the parliamentary elections of September 2018 by 5 percentage points relative to the 2014 elections, giving them 18% of the seats in the Riksdag. Over the past few years, right-wing parties have also seen their vote share increase significantly in other parts of Europe, including Italy, Poland, and Germany.

³See Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Mayda (2006); Dustmann and Preston (2006); Hanson et al. (2007); Facchini and Mayda (2009); Malhotra et al. (2013) for examples.

⁴A few notable examples include Citrin et al. (1997); Sniderman et al. (2004); Card et al. (2012); Tingley (2012).

⁵These hypotheses need not be mutually exclusive and can complement each other. A migration shock that depresses local conditions can upset voters if migrants are perceived as “different.” In contrast, a migration shock that stimulates local material conditions may not translate into higher electoral support for the incumbent if migrants cannot easily mingle with the host population. Empirically disentangling the relative contribution of each of these mechanisms is consequently challenging.

this period, Colombia experienced two different large migration waves. On the one hand, the intensification of the internal armed conflict resulted in nearly 10 percent of the country's population being forcefully displaced within the country.⁶ On the other hand, economic depression, political turmoil, and a surge of criminal violence in neighboring Venezuela induced a large migration wave to Colombia. According to Colombian migration authorities by 2018 the number of *registered* Venezuelans in Colombia was over 1.3 million.⁷ Because they are driven by crises, both migration shocks disproportionately feature poor, vulnerable, and uneducated households that flee conflict or political turmoil without much previous planning or preparation.⁸

If the *self-interest* hypothesis is valid, we should observe that the voter's response to migration shocks is mediated by how migrants impact the socioeconomic conditions of the receiving community. If the *sociotropic* hypothesis has empirical leverage, we should see voters responding to international migration more than to internal migration, assuming that foreigners are perceived as part of an out-group relative to co-nationals from other municipalities. This is valid if internal migrants are likely to be perceived more positively by local voters as they share common characteristics such as nationality and culture. In contrast, international migrants may be more easily perceived as potential threats to cultural and social norms.⁹

We assess the effects of migration in voting behavior using longitudinal data at the municipal level in Colombia between 1994 and 2018.¹⁰ Since migrants choose their arrival municipalities and their choices may be correlated with voting behavior inside those areas, we cannot simply compare differences in electoral outcomes across municipalities with higher and lower migration inflows. Consequently, we exploit the fact that crisis-induced migrants tend to move disproportionately to municipalities where they have networks that were formed before the beginning of the crises.

⁶See [Dube and Vargas, 2013](#) and [Rozo, 2018](#) for a detailed description of the Colombian internal conflict.

⁷The actual figure is likely higher as registration is not enforced and a large share of migrants may actively avoid it and work in the informal sector.

⁸This does not preclude the existence of relatively wealthy migrants, who flee from crisis-origin locations to save their assets. But this type of migrant does not constitute a majority.

⁹This is a relative statement. Colombia and Venezuela share a language as well as a number of other traits due, among other reasons, to their common colonial heritage. All we need to make our argument, however, is that local voters perceive Venezuelan migrants as an out-group, relative to how they perceive other Colombians.

¹⁰Colombia's roughly 1,100 municipalities are equivalent to U.S. counties.

In particular, we leverage identification from two sources of exogenous variation in crisis-driven migration inflows at the municipality-year level. Municipal variation comes from the share of population within each receiving municipality that was born in expulsion regions and arrived before the crisis began. Annual variation comes from the number of individuals leaving each municipality (in the case of the internally displaced population) or arriving to Colombia from Venezuela, as the crises worsened. We interact these two sources of variation to create our *predicted migrant inflows* measure.

Our main identification assumption is that predicted migration inflows affect voting behavior only through actual migration and not through any other channel after controlling for a flexible set of municipal-level characteristics. First, because our estimates include fixed effects by municipality and year, they are not confounded by time-invariant differences across municipalities nor by annual aggregate shocks. Second, since the pre-existing networks of migrants coming from expulsion regions might be larger in places with specific characteristics that might have evolved over time in a way correlated with future electoral behavior, we include interactions between year dummies and a large set pre-migration shock municipal covariates. They include variables related to the incidence of conflict and violence, the magnitude of local and national public expenditures, the number of public institutions, poverty, inequality, labor market conditions, and economic growth. Third, we control for full interactions between department and year indicators in all our estimates.

The inclusion of these controls is important as identification relies on the exogeneity of the early settlements, an equivalence that is shown by [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2019\)](#) for the general case of Bartik instruments. Even when the share of early migrants is not exogenous, [Borusyak et al. \(2018\)](#) show that identification can be achieved if the aggregate shocks are as good as random, a condition that is satisfied when: i) one controls by observable municipal characteristics weighted by shock exposure and ii) there is a large number of observed shocks per period and a large number of periods. We meet these criteria.¹¹

¹¹One additional recent criticism to the validity of using early migrants networks to study the impacts of migration in that in settings in which migration flows to specific locations are stable over time one cannot disentangle the short- and long-term causal effects of migration ([Jaeger et al., 2018](#)). Our empirical strategy is not sensitive to this threat

Our analysis is structured in two parts. First, we examine the effects of migration inflows on political participation and the support of right-, center-, and left-wing ideologies in the presidential (first- and second-round) and the mayoral elections in Colombia. We find that only international migration inflows affect voting behavior in Colombian municipalities. Particularly, larger Venezuelan inflows result in higher political participation in the first and second round presidential elections. The point estimates suggest that when Venezuelan municipal predicted inflows increase by one standard deviation turnout increases by approximately 1.6 and 0.98 percentage points in the first and second presidential elections, respectively.

We also find that only larger inflows of international migration affect the composition of presidential votes from left- to right-wing political ideologies. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted inflow of Venezuelan migrants reduces the share of votes for left-wing political ideologies by 0.8 percentage points and increase the share of votes for right-wing ideologies by exactly the same amount in the first round elections. Considering that the mean support for left-wing ideologies was approximately 10 percent during the first round presidential elections, a reduction of 0.8 percentage points represents a substantial impact. When looking at the mayoral elections, nonetheless, we only find evidence supporting the fact that larger inflows of Venezuelan immigration result in higher political participation in the form of electoral turnout.

In a second stage, we test the validity of the *self-interest* motive mechanism. We do so by exploring whether the observed effects of migration inflows on political outcomes change when adding controls for contemporary variables that may have been affected by the migration flows and that are correlated with the socioeconomic conditions of receiving communities. These include violent crime, local and central government expenditures and income, population outflows, and transfers from the central government to internally displaced people. When we include these variables as controls in our baseline estimates, we do not see any changes in our core results.¹²

because the inflows of crisis-driven migrants are not stable in time, they are sudden and large in scale as a consequence of the intensification of the internal and the Venezuelan crises.

¹²These are arguably ‘bad controls’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) because they are likely affected by the migration shock. We however include them purposefully to investigate the extent to which these controls absorb (part of) the effect of migration on electoral outcomes.

Additionally, recall that we also include interactions of year dummies and pre-trend municipal characteristics and so we discard the possibility that differences in these dimensions between municipalities may be driving our main results. Consequently, we do not find evidence supporting the validity of the *self-interest* hypothesis.

Overall, we find that only international forced migration induces changes in voting behavior. Since Venezuelan migrants may be perceived more as outsiders relative to internally displaced Colombians, we do not find support for the validity of the *self-interest* hypothesis. Instead, our results support the validity of the *socio-tropic* hypothesis. However, it is also possible that the effects of Venezuelan migration on voting composition are explained by what we call *electoral polarization*, to describe the possibility that, pushed by the campaigning strategy of specific political parties, voters associate left-wing political ideologies with the current Venezuelan regime and they reduce their support for the left as a consequence of their fear of *becoming like Venezuela*. Although no municipal data is available to formally test this alternative mechanism, recent national perception surveys do point toward and increasing worry of Colombians with the possibility of a *Venezuela-nization* of the country. Therefore, with the available information we cannot disentangle the *socio-tropic* and *electoral polarization* channels.

Lastly, we examine whether municipalities that hosted different levels of IDP react heterogeneously to Venezuelan forced migration. We find that although all municipalities respond to larger Venezuelan migration by increasing political participation, only those municipalities that had been *less* exposed to IDP migration experience a change in the composition of votes from left- to right-wing political ideologies. This result also supports the validity of the *socio-tropic* hypothesis as it suggests that individuals who have been less exposed to relative cultural diversity show more antipathy toward migrants.

This paper contributes to the study of the effects of migration on political outcomes. Most of the work in this area has focused on studying the effects of voluntary migrants in developed countries (see [Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2008](#); [Otto and Steinhardt, 2014](#); [Barone et al., 2016](#); [Mayda](#)

et al., 2016; Harmon, 2017; Halla et al., 2017 for examples). Our contribution to this literature is two-fold. First, we study the effects of forced, crisis-induced migrants within a developing country. Forced migrants arrive in large numbers and are often traumatized by conflict, economic turmoil, crime victimization, or political persecution. They typically arrive with little economic means, and face large levels of uncertainty regarding the duration of their stay. As such, their impact on host economies may be vastly different than that of economic migrants arriving in developed countries. Additionally, developing countries host the bulk of forced migration in the world and have lower resources to attend these populations. This suggests that the effects of forced migration in these countries may be larger than what has been estimated for developed countries. Second, our set up allows us to disentangle the relative empirical relevance of the *self-interest* and *sociotropic* mechanisms in mediating the electoral effects of migration.

The article that comes closest to our study is Dustmann and Preston (2006) who study the effects of refugee migration on voting outcomes in Denmark. In line with our study the authors find that the allocation of a larger share of refugees leads to an increase on the vote share of right-leaning parties with an anti-immigration agenda. Our study adds to their contribution by contrasting the validity of the *self-interest* and *sociotropic* motive hypotheses inside a developing country. This is done by comparing the effects of internal and international migration on voting behavior.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some context on the two migration shocks that we analyze. Section III describes the sources of information we use to test the effect of different migration shocks on electoral outcomes and the mechanisms that may potentially explain them. Section IV discusses the empirical strategy used to identify the causal effect of migration shocks on voting behavior as well as several robustness tests. Section V summarizes the main results. Section VI explores the validity of the mechanisms driving our results. Finally, the last section concludes.

II Forced Migrants in Colombia

We study the political effects of internal forced migration as well as those of international migration originating in Venezuela and caused by that country's economic and political turmoil. Because both migration waves were induced by crises, they are characterized by large inflows of poorly educated and young individuals whose primary destinations are the major urban areas in Colombia.

II.1 Internal forced displacement

Colombia's internal armed conflict originated with the formation of the left-wing guerrilla organizations FARC and ELN in the mid-1960s. The conflict was a Cold War proxy war until the end of the 1980s. Yet, it escalated during the 1990s, fueled by the involvement of the guerrillas in illegal drug trafficking and the consolidation of right-wing paramilitary groups, who effectively became a third force in the conflict when splintered paramilitary armies colluded under an umbrella organization (the AUC). The escalation of the conflict was the main driver of the internal forced displacement witnessed in Colombia in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.¹³

Data from Colombia's Victims' Registry—which consolidates information on forced displacement and other forms of victimization obtained from local, national, public, and private institutions—suggests that the population of forced migrants is balanced in terms of gender (51 percent women) and disproportionately young. In particular, 39 percent of forcefully displaced individuals were 15 years old or younger at the time of displacement, an age group that represents 28 percent of Colombia's population. Survey-based evidence suggests that displaced individuals have low education levels (on average around 5 years of education) and that most of them are poor (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006; Garay, 2008; Carrillo, 2009). Moreover, because displacement originates mostly in rural areas, the main economic activity prior to the displacement of most victims is agriculture (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006; Carrillo, 2009).

¹³see Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Roza, 2018 for detailed descriptions of the Colombian conflict.

Importantly, for our identification strategy, it has been documented that forced migrants in Colombia largely move to areas where they have friends or relatives, and that are relatively close in distance to their municipalities of origin (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006; Carrillo, 2009; Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010).¹⁴ Internal migrants also value the provision of public goods when choosing their destination (Carrillo, 2009; Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010).

II.2 International migration from Venezuela

The beginning of the Venezuelan political crisis can be traced back to the election of Hugo Chávez as president on December 6, 1998. Chávez' socialist regime was characterized by constitutional amendments, land expropriations, the implementation of populist social programs, nationalizations, and restrictions on private businesses (Crašto and Álvarez, 2017). These policies were continued by Nicolás Maduro, who was elected president of Venezuela in 2013. Maduro's regime has dramatically worsened the economic and social crisis in Venezuela. Shortages of food and basic necessities became extremely common, and looting began to occur systematically throughout the country (Revista Semana, 2017). Moreover, insecurity became endemic, repression of the opposition became common, and systematic human rights violations by public authorities were repeatedly reported by the international media (see El Nuevo Herald, 2014; BBC News, 2017; BBC, 2016). This situation triggered large waves of out-migration by Venezuelans, who most often moved to neighboring Colombia.

Figure I shows the annual evolution of the total number of registered Venezuelan migrants entering Colombia between 1995 and 2018, as recorded at the different migration points established by the Colombian government. According to the official statistics, Venezuelan migration increased five-fold during this period, as the humanitarian crisis caused by Chávez and Maduro's regimes worsened.

¹⁴In regions facing extreme violence, however, individuals prefer to migrate to more distant locations and to relatively large cities. This is because of the sense of anonymity provided by urban areas located far from where the victimization episode occurred (Carrillo, 2009; Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010).

Initially, Venezuelan migrants consisted mainly of wealthy Venezuelans and entrepreneurs who came to invest in Colombia and fled to save their capital from expropriations and from high inflation ([Revista Semana, 2017](#); [Crasto and Álvarez, 2017](#)). As the crisis intensified, however, the core of Venezuelan migration shifted to the poorly educated population who report fleeing to Colombia to escape violent crime, political repression, and to look for basic necessities for survival ([NPR, 2018](#)). Indeed, according to recent characterizations of Venezuelan migrants based on the Colombian household surveys of 2015 and 2016, over 80 percent of registered migrants have not completed a high school education, at least half are 25 years old or less, and they are balanced in terms of gender (see [OLR, 2017](#)).

III Data

III.1 Crises-driven displacement

We employ two sources of information on forced displacement. Data on internal forced displacement come from Colombia's Victims' Registry (known by its Spanish acronym, RUV), which registers the number of individuals displaced as a consequence of the armed conflict. The RUV data includes information collected in the past by both private and public institutions, and the database is updated continuously with the aim of being a census of conflict victims who are eligible for reparations and assistance under Law 1448 of 2011 (known informally as the *Victims' Law*). The RUV is the best source of information on the victims of Colombia's armed conflict. While its coverage begins in 1985, in this article we focus on the period between 1994 and 2018 because of the availability of data on political outcomes during that period.

Data on the total number of Venezuelans arriving annually in Colombia is available through the Colombian Statistics Department for the period 1994 to 2018. The information between 1994 and 2002 was constructed using the population censuses of 1993 and 2005 and corresponds to the Venezuelan nationals that arrived to Colombia each year. The data from 2003 to 2018 come from

the information recorded at official migration points.

Figure I shows the aggregate IDP and Venezuelan migration inflows observed in Colombia during our period of analysis.

III.2 Voting behavior

Data on voting behavior for each municipality come from Colombia's electoral agency. We use data on municipal-level electoral results in presidential and mayoral elections to study the effects of forced migration on political participation, measured by the share of individuals who vote as a share of voting-age population (18 years or older),¹⁵ and support for left-, center-, or right-wing political ideologies. For each election, we classify all candidates according to their political party into left-, right-, and center-oriented ideologies, following the methodology proposed by [Fergusson et al. \(2017\)](#). Appendix A describes in detail the steps followed to classify each candidate.

III.2.1 Presidential elections

Our analysis of presidential elections focuses on the period 1994-2018, when there is information available on the votes for all presidential candidates.¹⁶ Presidents are elected by majority rule. If no candidate receives half plus 1 vote or more on election day, a run-off election between the two candidates with the most votes in the first round takes place three weeks later. The winning candidate governs for a 4-year period. We use information on the 6 first-round and 5 second-round (run-off) elections that occurred between 1994 and 2018.

¹⁵Municipal-level voting registries were not available for the entire sample period. They are available since 2002. If we compare turnout using registered voters or the voting-age municipal population as the denominator for the period 2002-2018 we observe a distribution that is extremely similar across measures. The difference is not statistically significant.

¹⁶Prior to 1994 the Colombian Electoral Bureau only recorded the municipal votes of the winning candidate.

III.2.2 Mayoral elections

Mayors are elected at the local level by plurality rule in a single election (there is no run-off for local elections). As in the case of the presidential elections, due to the availability on votes received for all candidates only since 1997 onwards, for our estimates we focus on the six local elections that took place between 1997 and 2015.

Figure II, III, IV, and V show the geographic distribution of the electoral outcomes that we analyze in the presidential and mayoral elections. In addition, Tables I and II present descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our analysis.

IV Empirical Strategy

As forced migrants do not choose their arrival municipalities randomly, we cannot use a mean comparison of the municipalities that receive higher and lower migration. More generally, it is reasonable to assume that migrant's decision of where to locate is associated with municipal characteristics that may be correlated with current and future voting behavior. To account for this possibility our empirical strategy exploits the fact that, as crises intensify in their locations of origin, migrants tend to move disproportionately to municipalities where they have networks, family, or acquaintances.¹⁷ In particular, we estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{mt} = \theta_1 \text{Pr. IDP Inflows}_{mt} + \theta_2 \text{Pr. Ven Inflows}_{mt} + X_{mt} \Delta' + \gamma_t + \alpha_m + \epsilon_{mt} \quad (1)$$

where m represents the municipality, t the election-year, Y is one of our dependent variables regarding electoral results, X is a vector of municipal time-varying controls, and α_m and γ_t represent

¹⁷Our measures of predicted inflows of forced migrants follow the standard practice in the literature. See Card, 2001 and Altonji and Card, 1991 for the pioneer approaches and Lewis and Peri, 2015 for a review of the literature on applications. However, our estimates are not subject by recent critiques to Bartik-type specifications (e.g. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2018) as we control for a large set of pre-established municipal characteristics -that may be correlated with the early migrant networks- interacted with year indicators. We also focus on the reduced form effects of the predicted migration inflows on electoral outcomes.

municipality and election-year fixed effects. Our measures of predicted migration inflows are constructed as:

$$\text{Predicted Venezuelan Inflows}_{mt} = \left[\frac{1}{\text{Pop}_{mt}} \left(\text{Venezuelan Outflows}_t \times \text{Venezuelan Share}_m^{1993} \right) \right] \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Predicted IDP Inflows}_{mt} = \left[\frac{1}{\text{Pop}_{mt}} \sum_{j \in J} \left(\text{IDP Outflows}_{jt} \times \text{Migrants Share}_{mj}^{1993} \right) \right] \quad (3)$$

where *Venezuelan Share*₁₉₉₃^{*m*} is the ratio of Venezuelans and the population born locally in municipality *m* and year 1993. *Migrants Share*_{*mj*}¹⁹⁹³ is the ratio of individuals born in municipality *j* living in *m* and the population born and living in *m* in 1993. We use the year 1993 as in that year the Colombian statistics agency collected the last population census before the intensification of the internal migration crises. *Venezuelan Outflows*_{*t*} represents the individuals leaving Venezuela and arriving in Colombia in year *t*; *IDP Outflows*_{*jt*} is the number of individuals who were internally displaced by conflict in municipality *j*—that belongs to the set *J* of all municipalities in Colombia—and year *t*; and *Pop*_{*mt*} is the municipal annual population.¹⁸ Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to account for potential serial correlation within municipalities.

Figure VI and VII illustrate the geographic distribution of our predicted migration inflows. They also present the correlation between the predicted and observed measures of inflows. Although there is information available for all the period of analysis for observed IDP inflows, we were only able to recover observed inflows of Venezuelan migrants from the population censuses of 1993 and 2005. The figures confirm that the predicted and observed measures of migrant inflows have a strong correlation. The figures also suggest that there was ample geographic variation on both internal and international migration inflows in Colombia.

Recently Jaeger et al. (2018) proposed that using early migrant settlements to identify the effects of

¹⁸Considering that the different elections take place in different months of the year, and, in order to have enough variation in migration outflows, when constructing the predicted inflows of forced migrants we aggregate the migration outflows for years *t* and *t*-1.

migration in hosting regions may confound its short- and long-term causal effects in countries where migration patterns are consistently directed to the same areas and are stable in time. Our empirical strategy is not sensitive to their critique because the inflows of internal and international migration were sudden and dramatically large in scale after the intensification of the crises.

IV.1 Robustness Tests

Municipal and election-year fixed effects

Because our identification strategy includes fixed effects by municipality and election-year, our estimates are not threatened by time-invariant differences across municipalities such as geographic variables, or by aggregate time shocks such as nation wide economic cycles. Our empirical strategy is thus valid to the extent that there are no time-varying omitted municipal characteristics that both are correlated with our predicted migration inflows measures and affect municipal electoral outcomes.

Pre-shock differences between municipalities

One important threat to our identification strategy may be caused by pre-shock differences in municipal characteristics that may be correlated with the early migrant settlements ([Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2019](#)). This may be the case to the extent that the post-shock evolution of such characteristics affects electoral outcomes. For instance, areas with a higher share of migrants in 1993 may have also had lower levels of conflict or violence, better institutions, more economic growth, more public investment, less poverty or inequality, or lower levels of informality relative to the rest of the country. If these characteristics affected electoral outcomes, through their effect on municipalities' economic performance, for instance, then our results would be biased.

To flexibly account for these potential threats, we control for the interaction of a large number of pre-shock municipal-level characteristics and election-year fixed effects. Our pre-shock controls include indicators of conflict intensity, violent crime, government intervention, institutional development, economic growth, poverty and inequality, and labor outcomes. In particular, we use the empirical model of equation 1 and add interactions of election-year dummies with the 14 static variables listed in Table II. We also included interactions of department and election-year fixed effects to account for regional trends which may

be confounding our results.

Excluding bordering municipalities

Another possible threat to our identification strategy is that most of the variation that we use is driven by Colombian municipalities that share a border with Venezuela where there are larger pre-settlements of the Venezuelan population. These municipalities may be affected by the Venezuelan crisis not only through migration shocks, but also through lower trade with Venezuela or larger demand for basic consumption items that are no longer available in Venezuela. These additional shocks may also be affecting voting behavior. To test for this possibility, we run our estimates excluding from our sample each one of the 32 Colombian departments at a time, to verify that our results were not driven by the high interactions of the Venezuelan economy with some departments such as La Guajira and Norte de Santander (which comprise most of the Venezuelan-Colombian border). Our results are robust to every one of the 32 sample restrictions (see Appendix B).

Using an alternative source of cross-sectional variation: distance to border-crossing locations

One alternative to computing our measure of *Predicted Venezuelan Inflows* is to interact the annual Venezuelan Outflows with the average distance from every municipality to each one of the border-crossing sites between Colombia and Venezuela. Our results are robust of using this alternative source of shock exposure, which by and large picks up the same variation as our baseline measure. The correlation between the average distance to the bilateral border-crossing sites and the share of Venezuelan population in 1993 is 0.64.

Checking the validity of the 2SLS coefficients

As an additional robustness check, we use our *Predicted IDP inflows* measure to instrument the observed yearly IDP inflows to each municipality. The identification assumption is that the predicted flows do not influence electoral outcomes through any channel other than the actual forced migration. The results for the first stage regression are reassuring across elections as they suggest that our predicted migration inflows measure has a strong correlation with the actual observed number of individuals arriving in each municipality (see panel F of Tables III, IV, and V). Unfortunately, the lack of available data on yearly arrivals of Venezuelans to each municipality prevents us from estimating an equivalent instrumental variables specifi-

cation for the case of the effects of the Venezuelan migration shock on electoral results.

Cumulative Migration Inflows

In our main estimates, when constructing the predicted inflows of forced migrants, we aggregate the migration outflows for years t and $t-1$ considering that the different elections take place in different months of the year. Consequently, in Appendix C we test whether our results change when accumulating the migration outflows between elections (which includes roughly 4 years). Our results remain unchanged, which might suggest that voters may be most sensitive to short-term migration inflows.

V Results

Presidential Elections

Our main results are presented in Tables III and IV. We find consistent and positive effects of Venezuelan migration on political participation in the form of electoral turnout for the presidential elections. We also find that larger inflows of Venezuelan migrants result in a re-composition of the number of votes from left- to right-wing political ideologies. These results are robust across the first- and second-round presidential elections (Tables III and IV, respectively) and to the inclusion of flexible trends parametrized in terms of pre-shock municipal characteristics.

For the case of the internal displacement inflows, we do not distinguish a significant effect in any of the outcomes that we study. It is worth noting that the lack of an effect in turnout in this case is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that suggests that internally displaced populations in Colombia, while entitled to vote, do not do so in practice. This is both because most internal migrants are below the voting age (see section II.1) and because many of the adults lack formal identification documents which are required for voting. This issue is so widespread that the provision of a *cédula* was included among the main benefits to be distributed to conflict victims under the *Victims' Law* by the Colombian government.¹⁹

The estimated effects of the migration shocks on electoral outcomes are economically meaningful. Focusing on Panel A and the specification that includes differential trends parametrized by pre-shock municipal

¹⁹If anything, there is weak evidence that turnout *decreases* in the run-off presidential election (Table IV) when no controls are included other than municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and department trends (column 1).

characteristics (even columns), a one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted Venezuelan (IDP) migration inflow increases political participation in the first (second) round presidential elections by 1.6 (0.98) percentage points. In turn, a one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted inflow of Venezuelan migrants reduces the share of votes for left-wing political ideologies by 0.8 percentage points and increases the share of votes for right-wing ideologies by exactly the same amount in the first round elections. Since the mean support for left-wing ideologies was only 10 percent during the first round presidential elections, a reduction of 0.8 percentage points in the support for left-wing political ideologies is substantial. The estimated coefficients for the impacts of Venezuelan and IDP migration are also statistically different across all elections.²⁰

Mayoral Elections

When we look at mayoral elections in Table V, we find weaker effects. Particularly, we only find evidence supporting the fact that larger inflows of Venezuelan immigration result in higher political participation (panel A). In particular, we observe that a one-standard-deviation increase in the predicted level of Venezuelan migration inflow causes an increase of 0.96 percentage points in political participation, an effects that is remarkably similar to that found for the second-round presidential election. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls and the estimation procedure, they are also not observed for IDP inflows. Although the estimated coefficients of the effects of Venezuelan inflows on the left-, center-, and right-wing support show similar signs relative to the presidential elections, it is plausible that they are not significant because there are no mayoral elections after 2015, when the Venezuelan migration showed the largest increment. As such, our mayoral elections sample has a lower variation on Venezuelan inflows than the one observed for the presidential elections.

VI Mechanisms

Our results point to the existence of asymmetric effects of international and internal migration on electoral outcomes. Particularly, only Venezuelan migration inflows result in higher political participation and a re-composition of votes from left- to right-wing ideologies. In this section we explore the validity of plausible mechanisms driving the asymmetric responses to migration inflows.

²⁰We carried this test using the coefficient values, variances, and covariances obtained from Panel A across elections.

VI.1 Self-interest Motives

First, it is possible that the effect of migration shocks on the electoral behavior of host communities is explained by *self-interested* voters, who react to the way migration affects their economic and social well-being. This mechanism can be tested by examining how the estimated effect of migration shocks on electoral outcomes changes when controlling for socio-economic variables that are likely to be affected by the shocks. Large forced migration inflows, for example, may be associated with a disproportionate targeting of public resources to support these populations, or with larger business profits as wages fall due to an increased supply of labor.²¹ We test for these mechanism on Table VI by re-estimating the specification of equation 1 (including all the previous controls listed in Tables III to V) and adding as covariates the time-varying outcomes that may have changed in response to migration shocks. While we acknowledge that these may be endogenous or ‘bad’ controls (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), we are purposefully interested in examining how the reduced-form effect of internal and international migration waves on electoral outcomes changes when controlling for the potential intermediate variables. These variables include homicide rate, municipal tax income, municipal public expenditure, central government transfers to municipalities, population, and IDP outflows. These variables include all the available observable variation for all the municipalities in our sample throughout our complete period of study. Importantly, all of our estimates are robust to the inclusion of these controls, suggesting that none of the observed effects are driven by changes on these endogenous variables.²²

Another possible explanation for the asymmetric effects observed for Venezuelan and IDP migration inflows is that we have not accounted for the large response to IDP migration from the Colombian government. Beginning in 1997 the Colombian government started creating institutions and social programs (mainly in the form of transfers) to support the victims of conflict, including IDP. For instance, Law 387 of 1997 created the *Fondo Nacional para La Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada*, an special fund dedicated to the holistic attention of IDP population, facilitating food security, health, education, and housing access.

²¹ As documented by Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Mayda (2006); Hanson et al. (2007); Facchini and Mayda (2009); Malhotra et al. (2013); Del Carpio and Wagner (2015); Altindag et al. (2018).

²² To the extent that we are also controlling for interaction effects of year dummies with pre-trend characteristics related with conflict intensity, violent crime, government intervention, institutional development, economic growth, poverty, inequality, and labor outcomes (as listed in Table II). We can also discard the possibility that differences in these dimensions between municipalities may be driving the observed effects of migration on electoral outcomes.

Moreover, Law 1448 of 2011 provided resources to receiving areas, created job opportunities, and provided seed capital for productive projects.

Using data from several Colombian government agencies²³ we construct a municipal measure that approximates the amount of resources received by the municipalities hosting IDP during each election (see Figure VIII for the aggregate values).²⁴ We then estimate our main specification controlling for these municipal transfers. The results are presented in the even columns of Table VI and remain unchanged relative to when this control is not accounted for.

Overall, our results are not consistent with the *self-interest* motives. Although, we are only able to test whether the estimated effects are explained observable variables (as well as by a large number of interactions between year and pre-period municipal characteristics) these variables correspond all the observables available during the period of analysis for all the municipalities in the sample. Moreover, even if migration inflows have strong effects in other unobserved covariates that we cannot control for, then local or national governments may have reacted to these effects, which should be accounted for by including controls for governmental behavior. If this is the case, this would suggest that the *self-interest* motive hypothesis is, at best, only partially relevant for explaining how voters react to migration flows.

VI.2 Sociotropic Motives and Electoral Polarization

Two potential residual explanations consistent with our results are that voters response to forced migration inflows are explained by *sociotropic* motives or by the association of left-wing ideologies to the regime-driven Venezuelan failure.

The sociotropic hypothesis suggests that voters simply dislike migrants as they see them as a threat to their in-group status quo. Our results are consistent with these hypothesis as we see that only Venezuelan migration induces effects on voting behavior. Despite the fact that both types of migrants could be equally perceived by locals as a threat to their economic status (i.e.g, their jobs, wages, taxes, or public service ac-

²³Particularly, using information for 1995 and 2001 from the *Sentencia T-025* of the Supreme Court and data for 2002 and 2018 from the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Department.

²⁴For this purpose we estimate the average national expenditures to support each displaced individual between 1997 and 2018 and then imputed the received transfers by each municipality according to the number of displaced individuals who entered each municipality during each election year as well as the previous year (t and $t-1$).

cess), local voters seem to react more drastically towards international migrants. Our results, consequently, support the idea that negative political attitudes towards immigration are more related to concerns related to cultural rather than self-interest economic motives.

In turn, the *electoral polarization* hypothesis suggests that political parties may highlight the association between left-wing ideologies and the Venezuelan crisis in their campaigning as a way to create fear among voters and reduce the electoral support to left-leaning parties. Indeed, during the last presidential elections in Colombia (2018) right-wing political parties pushed forward the theory that voting for the left was equivalent to transforming Colombia into another Venezuela (see [El Espectador, 2018](#); [BBC, 2018](#); or [El País, 2018](#) for media evidence). For instance, billboards were posted across the country with messages such as: “*Vote para que Colombia no sea otra Venezuela*” [Vote so Colombia will not become another Venezuela] (see [BBC, 2018](#)) or “*No quiero vivir como Venezolano*” [I do not want to live like a Venezuelan] (see [Letras Libres, 2018](#)). This type of publicity was sponsored by right-wing presidential candidates, which in turn won the elections.

A formal test of these two potential mechanisms is more difficult since Colombia lacks perception surveys covering our sample period that contain information for enough municipalities.²⁵ We therefore acknowledge that any support for a mechanism other than the *self-interest* channel (which we rule out) is only residual.

Existing aggregate perception surveys, however, support the validity of the *socio-tropic* and *electoral polarization* hypotheses. For instance, a survey carried out to 1,200 individuals representative of 96% of Colombian voters every two months between September of 2017 and November of 2018 in 57 municipalities including the 14 most populated Colombian cities, suggested that roughly 50% of voters thought Colombia could repeat Venezuelan history and 45% of voters disagree with the statement that Colombia should host Venezuelan migrants (See Figure IX).²⁶

Overall, our findings imply that voters respond only to international migration inflows by increasing po-

²⁵ *Latinobarometer* surveys about 1,200 individuals in Colombia in 20 of the 33 departments—the second administrative level, equivalent to U.S. states—with department samples ranging from 20 to 100 individuals (and 205 in Bogota). This provides neither representativeness nor the ability to directly test the effect of migration shocks on the perceptions of local communities.

²⁶ The surveys were carried out by *Invamer S.A.S. Gallup* and were funded by three large news outlets including *Caracol Televisión*, *Semana*, and *Blu radio*. See [Invamer \(2018\)](#).

litical participation and shifting their votes towards right-wing political ideologies. We do not find evidence supporting the idea that any of these effects are explained by *self-interested* motives. Moreover, we argue that these effects are explained by the fact that Venezuelan migrants may have triggered in-group bias or that left-wing ideologies are now associated to the Venezuelan crises.

VI.3 Exploring the Role of Ethnic or Regional Diversity

In this section we explore whether municipalities that have been more exposed to IDP migration responded in different ways to the international Venezuelan migration inflows. This idea was originally proposed by Allport (1954), who argues that the attitudes towards minorities may be affected by the ethnic composition of the locality in which individuals live. The author poses that the interaction between ethnic groups can lead to more understanding under four conditions: equal group status, common goals, inter-group cooperation and authority support. To test for these heterogeneous effects, we estimate the median of the cumulative IDP inflows received between 1995 and 2018 by municipality and use it to split our sample between municipalities more and less exposed to IDP migration. We then estimate the effects of Venezuelan migration separately for municipalities above and below the median level of IDP inflows.

The results are presented in Table VII and suggest two interesting facts. First, electoral participation in the form of turnout increased disproportionately in municipalities more exposed to IDP migration following the Venezuelan migration shock. Second, however, the re-composition of votes from left to right-wing political ideologies is only observed for municipalities that have been exposed to relatively small IDP shocks. This is consistent with the interpretation that voters antipathy towards Venezuelan migrants is less prevalent in areas that have been disproportionately affected by past migration shocks and that as such have higher ethnic or regional diversity. This result is in line with the *socio-tropic* motive hypothesis and suggests that Colombian voters antipathy towards international immigration has deep roots in out-group discrimination.

VII Discussion

This paper contributes to the growing literature that examines the effects of migration inflows on voting behavior. Unlike previous literature, however, we examine the empirical validity of two potential mechanisms: the *self-interest* and the *sociotropic* hypotheses. Our focus on Colombia allows us to identify the relative empirical relevance of these mechanisms, because the country has experienced simultaneous shocks on crisis-driven internal displacement as well as international migration from neighboring Venezuela.

Our empirical strategy relies on estimating *predicted* measures of internal and external migration flows. These are obtained by multiplying the aggregate annual flow of internal refugees and Venezuelan migrants to Colombia, with the pre-shock (1993) population share of migrants. The predicted flows are exogenous to the municipal electoral outcomes after controlling for differential municipal trends parametrized by a large number of pre-shock municipal characteristics.

We only find evidence of significant effects of international migration on voting behavior. Particularly, larger international migration inflows are associated with an increase in political participation and a re-composition of votes from left to right-wing oriented political ideologies. Notably, these results are, by and large, not accounted for by the observed changes caused by migrants in such socioeconomic variables.

We interpret these findings as consistent with the idea that negative political perceptions about Venezuelan migrants are not fully explained by a deterioration of the economic and social well-being of host communities. Voters thus appear to have *sociotropic* motives when reacting to Venezuelan migration at the polls. This may be explained by the perception among Colombians that migrants with different nationalities, races, or religions are a threat to local social or cultural norms. Our results are also in line with the possibility that voters respond to larger inflows of international migrants by associating their originating crises with the legacy of left-wing regimes.

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Table (I) Descriptive Statistics

	Year	Obs.	Average	St. Deviation
Panel A. Presidential Elections First Round [election years: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018]				
IDP Inflows (Indv.)	1994-2018	6,837	546.83	2,947.87
IDP Inflows (% Pop.)	1994-2018	6,837	0.01	0.04
Predicted IDP Inflows	1994-2018	6,837	0.07	0.13
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	1994-2018	6,837	20.46	84.19
Population (by municipality)	1994-2018	6,837	42,388.36	253,751.5
Population 18+ (by municipality)	1994-2018	6,837	27,331.45	175,061.7
Total Votes	1994-2018	6,837	12,225.87	85,847.1
Votes for Left	1994-2018	6,837	1660.51	17,512.04
Votes for Center	1994-2018	6,837	5,588.79	42,007.01
Votes for Right	1994-2018	6,837	4,338.44	33,479.78
Share of Total Votes (% Pop. 18+)	1994-2018	6,837	0.48	0.62
Share of Votes for Left	1994-2018	6,837	0.10	0.13
Share of Votes for Center	1994-2018	6,837	0.50	0.33
Share of Votes for Right	1994-2018	6,837	0.35	0.28
Panel B. Presidential Elections Second Round [election years: 1994, 1998, 2010, 2014, and 2018]				
IDP Inflows (Indv.)	1994-2018	4,886	317.24	1,817.44
IDP Inflows (% Pop.)	1994-2018	4,886	0.01	0.03
Predicted IDP Inflows	1994-2018	4,886	0.05	0.12
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	1994-2018	4,886	26.61	98.44
Population (by municipality)	1994-2018	4,886	42,798.38	256,869.2
Population 18+ (by municipality)	1994-2018	4,886	27,837.05	178,817.2
Total Votes	1994-2018	4,886	13,374.79	87,750.99
Votes for Left	1994-2018	4,886	1,562.39	28,700.8
Votes for Center	1994-2018	4,886	6,018.10	43,606.9
Votes for Right	1994-2018	4,886	5,100.85	38,203.95
Share of Total Votes (% Pop. 18+)	1994-2018	4,886	0.54	0.17
Share of Votes for Left	1994-2018	4,886	0.07	0.16
Share of Votes for Center	1994-2018	4,886	0.51	0.41
Share of Votes for Right	1994-2018	4,886	0.38	0.35
Panel C. Mayoral Elections [election years: 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015]				
IDP Inflows (Indv.)	1997-2015	5,555	681.39	3,334.75
IDP Inflows (% Pop.)	1997-2015	5,555	0.01	0.04
Predicted IDP Inflows	1997-2015	5,555	0.08	0.12
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	1997-2015	5,555	10.58	32.16
Population (by municipality)	1997-2015	5,555	43,226.03	258,377.9
Population 18+ (by municipality)	1997-2015	5,555	27,742.76	176,833.3
Total Votes	1997-2015	5,555	14,405.39	74,185.56
Votes for Left	1997-2015	5,555	1,201.54	20,807.4
Votes for Center	1997-2015	5,555	8,850.54	41,671.98
Votes for Right	1997-2015	5,555	1,707	7,947.282
Share of Total Votes (% Pop. 18+)	1997-2015	5,555	0.68	0.21
Share of Votes for Left	1997-2015	5,555	0.04	0.12
Share of Votes for Center	1997-2015	5,555	0.71	0.26
Share of Votes for Right	1997-2015	5,555	0.13	0.20

Table (II) Descriptive Statistics - Control Variables

Variable	Year	Obs.	Average	Standard Deviation	Classification
Hectares of Coca Crops	1999	1,124	142.46	960.24	Conflict and Violence
N. of Terrorist Attacks	1993	1,124	0.66	2.63	Conflict and Violence
Homicide Rate (per 100,000 Indv.)	1995	1,048	52.92	66.89	Conflict and Violence
Municipal Tax Income (Millions)	1995	1,098	1,033	16,066	Government Finance
Mun. Public Expenditure (Thousands)	1995	1,098	2,909	28,866	Government Finance
Central Gov. Transfers (Millions)	1995	1,098	1,168	5,348	Government Finance
Number of Financial Institutions	1995	1,046	1.75	8.92	Institutions
Number of Tax Collection Offices	1995	1,046	36.05	182.37	Institutions
Per capita GDP (Millions)	2005	1,097	6.38	6.63	Economic Growth
Night Light Density	1995	1,048	3.97	7.47	Economic Growth
GINI	1993	1,043	0.46	0.04	Poverty and Inequality
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN, % Households)	1993	1,035	52.98	19.21	Poverty and Inequality
Subsidized Health System Cov. (%Pop.with UBN)	1998	1,136	0.72	0.41	Poverty and Inequality
Informal Labor* (% Household)	2005	1,114	0.95	0.06	Labor Market
Homicide Rate (per 100,000 Indv.)	1994-2015	24,411	45.32	64.80	Endogenous
Municipal Tax Income (Millions)	1994-2015	24,189	6,585	109,238	Endogenous
Mun. Public Expenditure (Thousands)	1994-2015	24,156	22,486	221,487	Endogenous
Central Gov. Transfers (Millions)	1994-2015	24,156	616.81	1,524.35	Endogenous
Population	1994-2015	24,684	37,975	231,550	Endogenous
IDP Outflows (Individuals)	1994-2015	24,684	302.60	1,079.34	Endogenous
IDP Transfers (Billions)	1994-2018	28,075	3.55	27.35	Endogenous

Notes: *Informal Labor is a dummy variable equal to one if less than 100% of the economically active population within a household does not contribute to the pension system.

Table (III) Effects of crises-driven migration on presidential elections (First-Round)

Dependent variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.00001* (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.1890 (0.2555)	0.1877 (0.2278)	0.0457 (0.0401)	0.0416 (0.0386)	-0.0332 (0.0203)	-0.0471** (0.0222)	-0.0556 (0.0522)	-0.0283 (0.0390)
Adj. R-squared	0.263	0.269	0.728	0.748	0.919	0.926	0.890	0.903
Panel B. Venezuelan Migration Shock- Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.00001* (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Adj. R-squared	0.263	0.268	0.727	0.748	0.919	0.926	0.889	0.903
Panel C. Internal Displacement Shock- Reduced Form								
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.1850 (0.254)	0.1851 (0.226)	0.0483 (0.041)	0.0427 (0.039)	-0.0321 (0.020)	-0.0470** (0.022)	-0.0595 (0.054)	-0.0295 (0.040)
Adj. R-squared	0.263	0.268	0.727	0.747	0.919	0.926	0.889	0.903
Panel D. Internal Displacement Shock- OLS								
IDP (% Total Population)	-0.1633* (0.084)	-0.1095 (0.107)	0.1758* (0.099)	0.1704* (0.099)	0.0096 (0.069)	-0.0399 (0.073)	-0.2227*** (0.079)	-0.1610** (0.065)
Adj. R-squared	0.262	0.268	0.728	0.748	0.919	0.926	0.889	0.904
Panel E. Internal Displacement Shock- 2SLS (Second-Stage)								
IDP (% Total Population)	2.5708 (3.393)	2.4874 (2.901)	0.6718 (0.465)	0.5742 (0.431)	-0.4455 (0.330)	-0.6321** (0.315)	-0.8276 (0.585)	-0.3965 (0.447)
Panel F. Internal Displacement Shock- 2SLS (First-Stage)								
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.072*** (0.021)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.072*** (0.021)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.072*** (0.021)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.072*** (0.021)	0.074*** (0.023)
F-test (Excluded Instrument)	11.66	11.06	11.66	11.06	11.66	11.06	11.66	11.06
Observations (All Panels)	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837
Controls (all panels)								
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year × Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict and Violence × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Government Finance × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Institutions × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Growth × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Poverty and Inequality × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Labor Market × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Standard Deviation (Indp. Variables)								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows								84.194
Predicted IDP Inflows								0.1282
IDP (% Pop.)								0.0382

Notes: Clustered standard errors at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.

Table (IV) Effects of crises-driven migration on presidential elections (Second-Round)

Dependent variable	Share of Total Votes (1)	(2)	Share of Votes for Left (3)	(4)	Share of Votes for Center (5)	(6)	Share of Votes for Right (8)
Panel A. Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form							
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.00001** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Predicted IDP Inflows	-0.0314** (0.0143)	0.0003 (0.0159)	0.0020 (0.0263)	-0.0047 (0.0194)	-0.0319*** (0.0118)	-0.0066 (0.0137)	0.0096 (0.0296)
Adj. R-squared	0.806	0.821	0.890	0.908	0.971	0.975	0.966
Panel B. Venezuelan Migration Shock- Reduced Form							
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.00001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Adj. R-squared	0.806	0.821	0.890	0.908	0.971	0.975	0.966
Panel C. Internal Displacement Shock- Reduced Form							
Predicted IDP Inflows	-0.0327** (0.014)	-0.0004 (0.015)	0.0038 (0.028)	-0.0040 (0.020)	-0.0320*** (0.012)	-0.0066 (0.014)	0.0091 (0.030)
Adj. R-squared	0.805	0.819	0.887	0.906	0.971	0.975	0.966
Panel D. Internal Displacement Shock- OLS							
IDP (% Total Population)	-0.1267*** (0.043)	-0.0860** (0.037)	-0.0023 (0.057)	-0.0050 (0.054)	0.0046 (0.050)	-0.0161 (0.086)	0.0002 (0.079)
Adj. R-squared	0.805	0.819	0.887	0.906	0.971	0.975	0.966
Panel E. Internal Displacement Shock- 2SLS (Second-Stage)							
IDP (% Total Population)	-0.6530* (0.363)	-0.0089 (0.324)	0.0754 (0.541)	-0.0841 (0.439)	-0.6387** (0.273)	-0.1381 (0.304)	0.1893 (0.671)
Panel F. Internal Displacement Shock- 2SLS (First-Stage)							
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.050*** (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.048*** (0.014)
F-test (Excluded Instrument)	9.74	11.57	9.74	11.57	9.74	11.57	11.57
Observations (All Panels)	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886
Controls (all panels)							
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year × Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict and Violence × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Government Finance × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Institutions × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Growth × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Poverty and Inequality × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Labor Market × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Standard Deviation (Indp. Variables)							
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows							98.439
Predicted IDP Inflows							0.1176
IDP (% Pop.)							0.0273

Notes: Clustered standard errors at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table (V) Effects of crises-driven migration on mayoral elections

Dependent variable	Share of Total Votes (1)	(2)	Share of Votes for Left (3)	(4)	Share of Votes for Center (5)	(6)	Share of Votes for Right (7)	(8)
Panel A. Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0003*	0.0003*	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0002	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Predicted IDP Inflows	-0.0037	0.0078	0.0408	0.0354	0.0244	0.0076	0.0244	0.0344
	(0.0351)	(0.0362)	(0.0256)	(0.0280)	(0.0508)	(0.0541)	(0.0343)	(0.0360)
Adj. R-squared	0.788	0.798	0.406	0.420	0.415	0.433	0.470	0.482
Panel B. Venezuelan Migration Shock- Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0003*	0.0003*	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0002	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Adj. R-squared	0.788	0.798	0.405	0.420	0.415	0.433	0.470	0.482
Panel C. Internal Displacement Shock- Reduced Form								
Predicted IDP Inflows	-0.0076	0.0054	0.0417	0.0359	0.0270	0.0083	0.0216	0.0333
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Adj. R-squared	0.787	0.797	0.405	0.420	0.415	0.433	0.469	0.482
Panel D. Internal Displacement Shock- OLS								
IDP (% Total Population)	-0.1443***	-0.1490**	0.0439	-0.0439	-0.0788	0.0527	0.0675	0.0875
	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.089)	(0.108)	(0.067)	(0.088)
Adj. R-squared	0.788	0.798	0.405	0.420	0.415	0.433	0.469	0.482
Panel E. Internal Displacement Shock- 2SLS (Second-Stage)								
IDP (% Total Population)	-0.0595	0.0476	0.3252	0.3163	0.2108	0.0728	0.1685	0.2941
	(0.270)	(0.320)	(0.223)	(0.264)	(0.389)	(0.474)	(0.276)	(0.327)
Panel F. Internal Displacement Shock- 2SLS (First-Stage)								
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.128***	0.113***	0.128***	0.113***	0.128***	0.113***	0.128***	0.113***
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.026)
F-test (Excluded Instrument)	17.04	19.63	17.04	19.63	17.04	19.63	17.04	19.63
Observations (All Panels)	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555
Controls (all panels)								
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year × Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict and Violence × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Government Finance × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Institutions × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Growth × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Poverty and Inequality × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Labor Market × Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Standard Deviation (Indp. Variables)								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows								32.158
Predicted IDP Inflows								0.1242
IDP (% Pop.)								0.0399

Notes: Clustered standard errors at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.

Table (VI) Accounting for Socio-Economic Controls

Dependent variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Presidential Elections (First-Round)								
Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0002*** (0.0001)	0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.1890 (0.2275)	0.1872 (0.2278)	0.0416 (0.0385)	0.0415 (0.0385)	-0.0490** (0.0223)	-0.0468** (0.0222)	-0.0262 (0.0380)	-0.0284 (0.0390)
Adj. R-squared	0.269	0.269	0.748	0.749	0.926	0.926	0.904	0.904
Observations	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837
Panel B. Presidential Elections (Second-Round)								
Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0000* (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Predicted IDP Inflows	-0.0017 (0.0154)	-0.0023 (0.0153)	-0.0048 (0.0190)	-0.0044 (0.0195)	-0.0067 (0.0135)	-0.0063 (0.0138)	0.0099 (0.0290)	0.0090 (0.0299)
Adj. R-squared	0.825	0.825	0.908	0.908	0.975	0.975	0.966	0.966
Observations	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886
Panel C. Mayoral Elections								
Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0003* (0.0002)	0.0003* (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0002)
Predicted IDP Inflows	-0.0037 (0.0351)	0.0087 (0.0356)	0.0408 (0.0256)	0.0337 (0.0282)	0.0244 (0.0508)	0.0023 (0.0539)	0.0244 (0.0343)	0.0375 (0.0360)
Adj. R-squared	0.788	0.800	0.406	0.421	0.415	0.434	0.470	0.482
Observations	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555
Controls								
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year × Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-trend × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Homicide Rate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal Tax Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal Public Expenditures	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Central Government Transfers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
IDP Outflows	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
IDP Transfers	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Clustered standard errors at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table (VII) Impacts of Venezuelan Migration in Municipalities with High IDP Migration

Dependent variable	Share of Total Votes		Share of Votes for Left		Share of Votes for Center		Share of Votes for Right	
	Above (1)	Below (2)	Above (3)	Below (4)	Above (5)	Below (6)	Above (7)	Below (8)
Panel A. Presidential Elections (First-Round)								
Venezuelan Migration Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0006*** (0.0002)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0001** (0.0000)
Adj. R-squared	0.995	0.877	0.790	0.838	0.929	0.951	0.912	0.934
Observations	3,417	3,420	3,417	3,420	3,417	3,420	3,417	3,420
Panel B. Presidential Elections (Second-Round)								
Venezuelan Migration Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0006*** (0.0002)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0003)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Adj. R-squared	0.869	0.860	0.944	0.932	0.970	0.987	0.976	0.978
Observations	2,062	2,824	2,062	2,824	2,062	2,824	2,062	2,824
Panel C. Mayoral Elections								
Venezuelan Migration Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0015* (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0013 (0.0011)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Adj. R-squared	0.789	0.870	0.549	0.532	0.531	0.523	0.581	0.560
Observations	2,748	2,807	2,748	2,807	2,748	2,807	2,748	2,807
Controls								
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year × Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict and Violence × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Government Finance × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Institutions × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Growth × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Poverty and Inequality × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Labor Market × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Endogenous Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Clustered standard errors at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure (I) Annual Venezuelan and IDP Inflows in Colombia

Notes: Venezuelan migration between 1994 and 2002 was estimated with information available from the population censuses of 1993 and 2005. The data available from 2003 to 2018 come from the official statistics of migration produced by the Colombian Statistics Department and *Migración Colombia*, it includes transitory migration.

Figure (II) Mean Share of Total Votes (% of Population 18+ years)

Notes: For the mayoral elections a few municipalities show share of votes larger than 1 as there have been cases of voter fraud.

Figure (III) Average Share of Vote for Left-, Center-, and Right-Wing Political Ideologies (Presidential Elections First-Round)

Figure (IV) Mean Share of Vote for Left-, Center-, and Right-Wing Political Ideologies (Presidential Elections Second-Round)

Figure (V) Average Share of Vote for Left-, Center-, and Right-Wing Political Ideologies (Mayoral Elections)

Figure (VI) Predicted Venezuelan Inflows in 1993 and Aggregate Venezuelan Inflows between 1993 and 2005

Notes: Municipalities with missing information were created after 1993. The maps were constructed using information from the populations censuses of 1993 and 2005. *Predicted Venezuelan Inflows in 1993* and *Venezuelan Inflows between 1993 and 2005* were constructed using the following formulas:
 Predicted Venezuelan Inflows 1993 = $\text{Venezuelans in 1993}_m / \text{Population Borned Abroad in 1993}_m$
 Venezuelan Inflows between 1993-2005 = $[\text{Aggregate Venezuelan Inflows 1993-2005}_m / \text{Population Borned Abroad between 1993-2005}_m]$

Figure (VII) Predicted and Observed IDP Inflows between 1994 and 2018 (Mean Values)

Notes: Municipalities with missing information were created after 1993. Predicted IDP Inflows were created according to equation (3) and observed IDP inflows correspond to the mean number of IDP inflows as a share of municipal population.

Figure (VIII) Share of National Public Budget Allocated by the *Ley de Víctimas* to IDP from 1996 and 2018

Figure (IX) Voters Perceptions towards Venezuelan Migration

Colombia might be in the same situation as Venezuela in the near future (% of respondents)

Colombia should host Venezuelan migrants (% of respondents)

Appendix I: Political Elections Data Base Construction

We constructed three data bases two for presidential and one mayor elections. The databases were constructed with original data from the *Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil*, the Colombian electoral authority. We begin all data bases after 1994, since after this year the electoral data has information on the total votes received for all candidates.

To begin we identify the political party of each candidate for mayor or presidential elections and then classify it in left, center, or right following the methodology proposed by [Fergusson et al. \(2017\)](#). The classification for each political party includes three steps.

1. Check party names, mottos, and slogans for words that identify the mayor's/president's party clearly as left leaning or right-leaning (e.g., communist, or socialist for left-wing oriented and conservative or Christian for right-wing oriented).
2. Since few parties can be classified using the method outlined in the previous step, check the party statutes (when available) for policy stances that are clearly left- or right-leaning. A party is coded left-wing if the party statutes include at least three of the following five leftist policy positions: (1) pro-peasant, (2) advocates greater market regulation, (3) thinks that workers should be defended against exploitation, (4) advocates state-owned or communal property rights, and (5) anti-imperialist. A party is coded as right-leaning if its statutes include at least three of the following five right-wing policy positions: (1) economic growth is emphasized over redistribution, (2) advocates free market, orthodox policies, and privatization, (3) believes that family and religion are the moral pillars of society, (4) appeals to patriotism and nationalism, and accepts the suspension of some freedoms in order to guarantee security, and (5) prioritizes law and order. Parties that do not include at least three of the policy stances from either list in their statutes are classified as neither left- nor right-wing.
3. For parties for which official statutes are not available, check the government plan that candidates submit to the electoral authority before elections and, when available, search them

for the same policy stances as in the second step.

Appendix B: Excluding Each of the 32 Departments from the Sample

Figure (B.1) Presidential Elections (First-Round)

Presidential Elections (First-Round)

(a) Share of Votes for Center

(b) Share of Votes for Right

Notes: The numbers correspond to the estimated coefficient of a reduced form regression of each electoral outcome on the predicted Venezuelan inflows including all the controls listed on Table II (which comprise also interactions of election-year dummies with the static variables). Standard errors were clustered at the municipality level. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure (B.3) Presidential Elections (Second-Round)

Presidential Elections (Second-Round)

(a) Share of Votes for Center

(b) Share of Votes for Right

Notes: The numbers correspond to the estimated coefficient of a reduced form regression of each electoral outcome on the predicted Venezuelan inflows including all the controls listed on Table II (which comprise also interactions of election-year dummies with the static variables). Standard errors were clustered at the municipality level. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure (B.5) Mayoral Elections

Notes: The numbers correspond to the estimated coefficient of a reduced form regression of each electoral outcome on the predicted Venezuelan inflows including all the controls listed on Table II (which comprise also interactions of election-year dummies with the static variables). Standard errors were clustered at the municipality level. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Mayoral Elections

(a) Share of Votes for Center

(b) Share of Votes for Right

Notes: The numbers correspond to the estimated coefficient of a reduced form regression of each electoral outcome on the predicted Venezuelan inflows including all the controls listed on Table II (which comprise also interactions of election-year dummies with the static variables). Standard errors were clustered at the municipality level. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix C: Effects of Cumulative Migration Inflows Between Elections

Dependent variable	Share of Total Votes		Share of Votes for Left		Share of Votes for Center		Share of Votes for Right	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Presidential Elections (First-Round)								
Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001** (0.0000)
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.0787 (0.0988)	0.0774 (0.0992)	0.0253 (0.0213)	0.0253 (0.0213)	-0.0379*** (0.0144)	-0.0365** (0.0144)	-0.0034 (0.0164)	-0.0050 (0.0168)
Adj. R-squared	0.269	0.269	0.748	0.749	0.926	0.926	0.904	0.903
Observations	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837	6,837
Panel B. Presidential Elections (Second-Round)								
Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.0057 (0.0117)	0.0054 (0.0116)	-0.0004 (0.0115)	0.0001 (0.0118)	-0.0126 (0.0084)	-0.0122 (0.0085)	0.0113 (0.0154)	0.0105 (0.0159)
Adj. R-squared	0.825	0.825	0.908	0.908	0.975	0.975	0.966	0.966
Observations	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886	4,886
Panel C. Mayoral Elections								
Venezuelan Migration and Internal Displacement Shock - Reduced Form								
Predicted Venezuelan Inflows	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Predicted IDP Inflows	0.0005** (0.0003)	0.0005** (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Adj. R-squared	0.798	0.798	0.420	0.418	0.433	0.433	0.481	0.482
Observations	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555	5,555
Controls								
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year × Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-trend × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Homicide Rate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal Tax Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal Public Expenditures	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Central Government Transfers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
IDP Outflows	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
IDP Transfers	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Clustered standard errors at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.