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Media, Secret Ballot and Democratization in the US

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ABSTRACT

Can the media determine the success or failure of institutional reforms? We study the adoption of secret voting in the US and the role of media in this arguably crucial step to improve democracy. Using a difference-in-difference identification strategy and a rich dataset on local newspapers, we find that in areas with high levels of media penetration democratization outcomes improved following the adoption of the secret ballot. Specifically, the press contributed to the decrease in partisan attachment and support for dominant parties. The press also undermined the manipulation of electoral boundaries and the unintentional decline in turnout incentivized with the introduction of the secret ballot. We consider multiple concerns about our identification strategy and address the potential endogeneity of newspapers using an instrumental variable approach that exploits the introduction of wood-pulp paper technology in 1880 combined with counties' woodland coverage during the same period. Exploring the heterogeneous effects of our results, we argue that the media mattered through the distribution of information to voters and the increase of public awareness about political misconduct.

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D80, L82.

Keywords: Media, Secret Ballot, Democratization, Electoral Reforms, Gerrymandering.

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1 Introduction

Formal institutional reforms, while similar in appearance, often have diverging outcomes. In some cases, they effectively move society in the desired direction; in others, they are ineffective or even backfire (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2011). In 2011, for example, the World Bank found that “less than forty percent of the eighty countries receiving support for public sector reforms show some improvement in their CPIA [Country Policy and Institutional Assessment] scores. A quarter of those countries saw a decline in their rankings, whereas more than a third stayed the same” (Andrews, 2013, p.13).

A key reason why institutional reforms are sometimes ineffective is that they produce winners and losers, and the latter actively try to counteract them (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bowler & Donovan, 2007). Electoral reforms are particularly prone to this risk: though they potentially impact political outcomes directly, incumbent politicians may manipulate several levers to undo the impacts of any given reform (Persson et al., 2003).

In this paper, we argue that the role of the media is crucial in shaping these responses and resulting outcomes. A free press may help to keep the losers accountable and the winners informed, consolidating the effects of the reform. These conditions cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, in developing democracies, where reforms are most needed, the media is often hindered by a lack of resources, political biases, and selective censorship (Fergusson et al., 2018; Gentzkow et al., 2006; Snyder & Strömberg, 2010; Strömberg, 2015).

To test these ideas, we focus on one of the most critical electoral reforms for effective democratization: the introduction of the secret ballot. We analyze the case of the United States, a consolidated democracy today but also recognized for its clientelistic relationships and weak institutional framework during the 1880s and 1890s (Engstrom & Kernell, 2014; Keyssar, 2009). Analyzing the impact of the secret ballot and the media on electoral outcomes, in general, and the case of US democratization, in particular, offers valuable lessons for today, when “new democracies remain fragile and authoritarian systems endure” (Teorell et al., 2016).

Using a difference-in-difference identification strategy exploiting temporal variation in the adoption of vote secrecy across states and pre-existing degrees of county-level media penetration, we show that in places with greater access to newspapers in 1888 (when the process of secret ballot adoption in state legislatures began) democratization outcomes improved following the reform. In particular, turnout rates increased while partisan attachment and vote shares for the dominant parties decreased. Moreover, the media presence undermined the potential responses coming from political machines affected by the electoral reform. More specifically, it reduced the manipulation of electoral boundaries (or Gerrymandering), arguably through the increase of public

awareness about political misconduct ([Galvis et al., 2016](#)).

The magnitude of the media effects we uncover is also meaningful. An increase of one additional newspaper per thousand people in 1888 leads to an increase of approximately 8% in turnout after the introduction of the secret ballot, a 6.3% decline in the vote share for the dominant party, an expansion of the split-ticket voting of 6.4%, and a 15% decrease in a summary measure of the extent of Gerrymandering.

We address multiple concerns about our identification strategy. We show that our results are not likely driven by omitted time-varying factors or pre-existing differential trends, nor are they explained by state-specific time trends or initial conditions. Moreover, we rule out three alternative hypotheses emerging from the literature on democratization that could also be consistent with our results. First, we address the possibility that our results are just a sub-product of economic development as a whole (i.e., consistent with the modernization hypothesis claim). Second, we explore the possibility that our measure of media penetration was a proxy of the urbanization process that, according to some scholars, also leads to democratization. Finally, we examine whether our results are explained by correlated trends in areas with different proportions of foreign-born population, White people, or men. If so, our measure of media penetration could capture the forces of disenfranchisement against various groups of voters like foreigners, African Americans, and women. We find no evidence that these alternative interpretations explain our findings.

To further address the potential concern that newspapers influence outcomes for reasons other than their role in the diffusion of information after the adoption of secret voting, we use an instrumental variable approach. The introduction of wood-pulp-paper technology facilitated newspaper expansion in some areas more than others, depending on their relative woodland coverage in 1880. This motivates using the potential for wood-pulp production as an instrument for newspaper presence in each county. This approach, valid under the assumption that wood-pulp influenced political outcomes during this period only through its effect on newspaper availability, confirms our main findings.

To explore the mechanisms behind these results, we examine heterogeneous effects by the division between southern and non-southern states. Our results are mostly concentrated in non-southern states, where the press was less monopolized and literacy rates were high. Only one-tenth of southerners lived in urban areas, and transportation between cities was difficult, except by water ([McPherson, 2003](#)). This made civil mobilization against political machines harder to consolidate and, therefore, less likely in the South. These results are consistent with the idea that the media mattered because it provided information to voters and increased political accountability, where civil mobilization was a concern for the political machine. More generally, one key message from our analysis is that democratic institutions are complementary to each other, and

that improvements in one dimension (in our case, electoral reform effectively increasing voter freedom at the polls) require other dimensions (an active press) to be effective.

Our paper contributes to multiple literatures. Several scholars have examined the effects of the secret ballot in the US, uncovering its impact on turnout ([Aidt & Jensen, 2017](#); [Gerber et al., 2013](#); [Guenther, 2016](#); [Heckelman, 1995, 2000](#); [Reed, 2014](#)), votes for different political parties when multiple offices are up for election or “split-ticket voting” ([Engstrom & Kernell, 2014](#); [Raymond, 2014](#); [Rusk, 1970](#)), and different types of political misbehavior and fraud ([Kam, 2017](#); [Kuo & Teorell, 2016](#); [Wittrock et al., 2007](#)). Likewise, there is a large body of literature exploring the role of the media in US politics ([Gentzkow et al., 2006, 2014](#); [Snyder & Strömberg, 2010](#)), including its potential biases ([DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007](#); [Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010](#); [Puglisi & Snyder, 2015](#))¹. Our emphasis on understanding the role of the mass media in explaining the effectiveness of institutional reforms – including the selection and response of politicians facing those changes – is more novel.

Our findings complement and reinforce a key message from the literature on democratization: often, existing political elites invest to counteract the effects of these reforms. [Acemoglu and Robinson \(2008\)](#) develop a theory in which elites react to reforms that threaten their political power by investing in de facto methods to avert changes in equilibrium outcomes. Several studies present evidence consistent with the use of such methods, including electoral manipulation (e.g., [Anderson et al., 2015](#); [Baland & Robinson, 2008](#); [Bruce & Rocha, 2014](#)) and violence (e.g., [Naidu, 2012](#); [Fergusson et al., in press](#)). We contribute to this research by discussing theoretically and illustrating empirically the key role that mass media plays in determining the strength of these offsetting effects.

Our paper is the first to address – using a systematic empirical strategy – the importance of the media in shaping the consequences of the secret ballot on the process of democratization in the US. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to quantitatively measure the impact of vote secrecy on an unintended and complex type of fraud: the manipulation of electoral districts (and how this phenomenon was attenuated in places with high levels of media penetration). [Cox and Katz \(2002\)](#), [Engstrom \(2013\)](#), and [Engstrom and Kernell \(2014\)](#) point out different theories related to the Gerrymandering and electoral outcomes during the partisan era (1840–1900) but do not study the effect of the secret ballot on this practice.

Our work also contributes to the political science literature addressing the importance of paper ballot design on the success of electoral reforms ([Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006](#)). We show that what mattered the most for the electoral amendment of vote secrecy in the US was not just the adoption of state-printed tickets but that political brokers did

¹For a broader review see [Strömberg \(2015\)](#).

not easily monitor such ballots. Contrary to most of the research on the introduction of the secret ballot that considers the adoption of a state-printed blanket ballot, we focus on the effects of the secret ballot that did not have a straight-party option. We argue that a straight-party choice made it easy for political brokers to observe and/or instruct voters at the polls and, therefore, did not guarantee the intended vote secrecy completely. This lines up with the conclusions of others who highlight the importance of the ballot design beyond the change of the printer (Engstrom & Kernell, 2014; Reed, 2014; Wittrock et al., 2007).

Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on the effects of ballot features on elections. Previous studies have shown that ballot design can lead to voter confusion and misunderstanding (Frisina et al., 2008; Herrnson et al., 2012; Kimball & Kropf, 2008; Neely & Cook, 2008; Song, 2019; Wand et al., 2001), affect voter turnout (Augenblick & Nicholson, 2015; Bonneau & Loepp, 2014) and split-ticket voting (Calvo et al., 2009), and increase the number of invalid votes (Kimball & Kropf, 2005). We contribute to this literature by showing that ballot design can affect not only voter behavior but also the electoral strategies of political machines. In addition, we analyze how the effects of ballot design can depend on the availability of the media.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief historical background of the secret ballot reform in the US and the role of newspapers during the *Progressive Era*. Section 3 covers the theoretical expectations and a discussion that relates the secret ballot reform, the media, and the outcome variables used to proxy different features of democratization in the US. Section 4 presents the data and the construction of the main dependent and independent variables. Section 5 describes the identification strategy and the additional exercises used to address the problem of identification. Section 6 shows the results and the main robustness checks, Section 7 explores the potential mechanisms behind our results, and Section 8 concludes.

2 Historical background

In the 19th century, the influx of immigrants increased dramatically in many American cities. Millions of people from Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as Asia, arrived in the United States within a few decades, substantially increasing the electorate base. Political machines² viewed those immigrants as a vehicle to gain more power and recruited many of them with the promise of granting jobs and social services (Smithsonian-Museum, 2004). The newcomers turned to the machine's representatives in their county, who provided them with money or other assistance in exchange for casting their distinctive party ticket.

²A political machine in US politics is "a party organization, headed by a single boss or small autocratic group, that commands enough votes to maintain political and administrative control of a city, county, or state." (Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2016)

In each neighborhood, various civil servants were working under a ‘boss’ who was responsible for the representation of each party and on the command of multiple political brokers. This hierarchical system was intended to mobilize and monitor voters, which in this way supported the election of other machine leaders. Political machines benefited from a system relying on party tickets, which were printed by political parties before elections. The tickets were easy to identify, so voter decisions were easily monitored.

Election officials and state legislatures sought formulas to provide voter secrecy by abolishing the colorful and distinctive shape of the old paper ballots. This motivated the introduction of the state-printed blanket ballot – or “Australian ballot” – which hampered monitoring, and hence, obstructed vote control (Engstrom & Kernell, 2014). Indeed, concerns about fraud triggered the adoption of these blanket ballots, and over five years, at least two-thirds of the states adopted some version of them. The first state to introduce the Australian ballot was Massachusetts in 1888, but by 1900, almost the entire country had approved the new paper ballots (Lott & Kenny, 1999; Ludington, 1911).

Like other factors during the *Progressive Era*, the adoption of the Australian ballot responded to a critical national juncture leading to a significant electoral transformation during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the debate on why the adoption spread so rapidly across states is still a matter of discussion (Engstrom & Kernell, 2014; Teorell et al., 2016).

During this era, the media also played an essential role, best exemplified by the emergence of the Muckrakers’ movement. Created by multiple associations of journalists, the Muckrakers were known for their “factually detailed articles that exposed government corruption, poverty, hazardous working conditions, child labor, wasteful use of natural resources, and other problems facing American society” (Hillstrom, 2010, p. 21). These inquiries that attacked established institutions and leaders, denouncing corruption and political misconduct through contestatory manuscripts, articles, and cartoons, were important for the emergence and success of the institutional reforms adopted during this era. As Hillstrom (2010, p. 30) explains quoting Dorman (2000),

“The reports of the muckrakers shocked the American people and inspired them to demand change. In this way, the writers fed the fires of Roosevelt’s progressive reform efforts. “They turned local issues into national issues, local protests into national crusades,” [...] “They didn’t preach to the converted; they did the converting.”

As we will argue below, the differential success of the ballot reforms depended at least partly on the complementary presence of an active media.

3 Theoretical framework

Vote secrecy may influence the behavior of both voters and politicians. We now discuss our theoretical expectations concerning their reactions and the implications for observable outcomes, which we then examine in the data.

3.1 Voter behavior

Given that one of the relevant features of the institutional change was the implementation of a homogeneous printed ballot including all offices, the cost of split-ticket voting (supporting different parties for different offices) may have decreased. Furthermore, those who were resolute and qualified to vote were also able to express their electoral preferences more freely and detached from the partisan blocks induced by the ballot design (Rusk, 1970). In fact, with the new paper ballots, choosing among candidates running for different offices and opposing parties was more transparent, easier to do, and harder to monitor by political brokers (Aidt & Jensen, 2017; Engstrom & Kernell, 2014). Consequently, the introduction of vote secrecy should have harmed the shares of votes for hegemonic parties and increased the rates of split-ticket voting.

Importantly, we expect these effects to be greater in areas with better access to an active and informative media. Without information, citizens will have few clues to choose between competing candidates and could simply continue relying on the partisan label to guide their decision. Also, they might be less aware of the potential benefits of exercising their right to vote freely and of choosing better alternatives in the new political environment.

Turning to the effects on electoral turnout, citizens who were compensated for selling their votes may have decided not to do so anymore. It could have been the case, for example, that the extra costs of reading and marking the new paper ballots were too high for the population, who were used to picking up the party tickets before the elections and casting them directly on Election Day. Note that by then, most of the clients of the political machine were illiterate and foreign-born citizens who could not read English (Allen, 1910). This could have reduced their turnout to the polls (Heckelman, 1995, 2000). On the other hand, counteracting these effects, a free and politically empowered citizenry may be more willing to express their (true) preferences in the ballot boxes. This implies an ambiguous expectation on turnout following reforms to increase voter secrecy. However, since the positive impact crucially depends on having a more informed electorate, we expect the interaction between voter secrecy and more media access to have an unambiguously positive impact on electoral participation.

3.2 Electoral strategies

Vote secrecy may have increased the cost of vote-buying, making it difficult for political machines to monitor voters and therefore reducing its demand (Baland & Robinson, 2008). This reduction should have impacted the turnout rates. However, it did not necessarily imply a decline in electoral fraud as a whole. In fact, some recent studies have shown that it could have incentivized the introduction of new types of electoral trickery and manipulation. For instance, it may have increased turnout buying (Kam, 2017; Nichter, 2008), motivated the violent coercion of potential opposition or induced ballot stuffing (Kuo & Teorell, 2016). Furthermore, incumbent politicians who were highly dependent on vote-buying could modify their approach to influence outcomes, relying on changes in electoral rules or other techniques to compensate their loss in comparative advantage (Fergusson, Riaño, & Larreguy, 2020). In our context, one relevant lever to manipulate is setting up new congressional districts or modifying already existing ones for their electoral benefit (Engstrom, 2013), practice also known as Gerrymandering.

In short, threatened by the erosive impact of vote secrecy on political machines, we expect incumbent politicians to respond by attempting to increase both voter intimidation and manipulation of electoral boundaries. An empowered citizenry might, however, be more reluctant to admit these attempts, so the net effect of the secret ballot on these variables remain ambiguous.

However, we again expect the media to counteract politicians' efforts to intimidate voters or manipulate electoral boundaries while reinforcing voters' effective opposition to these strategies. By providing information to voters, the media could help capitalize the intended reduction of fraud, denouncing new electoral misconduct and deception and increasing political accountability. For instance, the role of the media in denouncing the manipulation of electoral boundaries is exemplified by the origin of the the word "gerry-mander". Appendix Figure A1 illustrates its first appearance in a cartoon of the Boston Gazette in 1812 (just eight years before the first period in our empirical analysis). This cartoon "expressed opposition to state election districts newly redrawn by Massachusetts' Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican Party" (National Museum of American History, n.d.) and was quickly reproduced in all the national newspapers at the time. In short, the interaction between the secret ballot and media should be unambiguously negative on measures of voter intimidation and electoral rules manipulation.

Finally, we note that to have meaningful effects, the media had to be 1) accessible to a significant part of the electorate, 2) neither captured nor silenced by those who were threatened by vote secrecy, and 3) able to influence people's choices effectively. Therefore, the positive effects of the secret ballot should be concentrated in places with

high levels of literacy, where a particular party did not monopolize the media and where the voters could be mobilized.

4 Data

4.1 Sources of information

We use multiple sources of information to construct the main dataset required for the empirical strategy. To study the voting behavior, we employ electoral data from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), which provides detailed electoral statistics from 1840 to 1972 at the county level in the US (Clubb et al., 2006). We restrict our analysis to the 1880–1920 period, covering the Progressive Era (1890-1914) while avoiding potential contamination from the introduction of women’s suffrage, another major electoral reform, at the beginning of the 1920s. This period also includes the years when the Australian ballot was adopted (1888 to 1911) for all states in the union during the Gilded Age, and it covers a sufficient number of elections before and after the adoption (+/- 8 years), which is needed for the verification of pre-trends.

To analyze electoral strategies, we use shapefiles on historical district boundaries compiled by Lewis, DeVine, Pitcher, and Martis (2013), who trace all the changes in the boundaries of congressional districts since 1791. Additionally, we follow Kuo and Teorell (2016)’s coding to study violence against voters in disputed house district races from the archives of the US House of Representatives committee on elections.

Data on the adoption of the Australian ballot and details about the use of special straight-ticket options come from the study of American laws conducted by Ludington (1911) and the subsequent works of Lott and Kenny (1999), Engstrom and Kernell (2014) and Kuo and Teorell (2016).

To explore the influence of the media, we gather rich data on the number, circulation, and partisan attachment of newspapers at the county level from two American Newspaper Directories: Rowell (1869) and Ayer (1910). Both sources include a description of all the newspapers and periodicals published in the United States from 1880 to 1909. We focus on the number of newspapers per thousand population instead of circulation figures as the primary independent variable. Data on circulation in these directories is incomplete and missing data is likely not random, which could generate not just less precise but also biased estimates of media penetration.³

Additional demographic characteristics and other controls at the county level are taken from the US Decennial Censuses. When required, these data were interpolated using the pre- and post-census figures for election years that do not coincide with the

³For instance, the directories do not report the circulation of a newspaper if it was established during the year when the information was gathered, the numbers they received from its publisher were incorrect, or the publisher refused to provide that information.

census. We use figures of the total population, population density, the fraction of White and male population, the percentage of foreign-born inhabitants, the manufacturing and farm output per capita, and aggregate literacy rates. We also use the information on the number of unimproved acres of woodland and forests at the county level derived from the agricultural census of 1880.

4.2 Outcome variables

Voting Behavior - We consider three electoral outcomes: Presidential Turnout, Vote Share for the Dominant Party, and Partisan Attachment, measured as the split-ticket voting between presidential and congressional elections when both elections coincide. We construct the following definitions for county c and presidential election t ,

$$\text{Turnout}_{c,t} = \frac{\text{Total valid votes}_{c,t}}{\text{Electoral Census}_{c,t}} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Split-Ticket Voting}_{c,t} = \left| \frac{\text{Democrat Vote Share}_{c,t}}{\text{Presidential Election}_{c,t}} - \frac{\text{Democrat Vote Share}_{c,t}}{\text{Congressional Election}_{c,t}} \right| \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Vote Share Dominant Party}_{c,t} = \min \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Presidential Vote Share}_{c,t} \\ \text{of Dominant Party} \end{array} ; \begin{array}{l} \text{Congressional Vote Share}_{c,t} \\ \text{of Dominant Party} \end{array} \right\} \quad (3)$$

Three comments about these definitions are in order. First, the parties' vote share is calculated as bipartisan vote fractions between Republicans and Democrats. Therefore, the measure of split-ticket voting is the same if we use the vote share of Republicans in the definition instead of the vote share of Democrats. Second, *Dominant Party* is defined as the party that simultaneously obtained more than the 50% of the votes in the presidential and congressional elections in at least two of the three races in 1880, 1884, and 1888. By using electoral results before the first adoption of the Australian ballot in 1888 we capture the prevailing machine party that dominated the county prior to the introduction of this reform. Finally, the vote share of the dominant party is not defined in places with competitive presidential and congressional elections before 1888. However, during this period, this was the exception rather than the rule. In fact, as [Gould \(2001\)](#) and [Engstrom and Kernell \(2014\)](#) argue, these years were characterized by strong partisan dominations that we could evidence in our sample, where just 5% of counties per election year have missing values in this variable.

Electoral Strategies - We examine two measures of electoral manipulation to study the strategies used by political machines.

First, we use the incidences of voter intimidation reported in challenged congressional races filed with the US committee on elections during the sample period. Those reports were made by citizens and losers of House elections who specified the general grounds of their charges and provided detailed proofs to justify their claims. To capture these

incidences, we define the following for the congressional district d and election t ,

$$\mathbf{Violence}_{d,t} = \mathbb{1} (\text{Election } t \text{ contested on the grounds of Intimidation in } d)_{d,t} \quad (4)$$

Second, we consider the alteration of electoral boundaries at the district level. We employ five variables now commonly used⁴ by some courts as evidence in disputed cases of Gerrymandering (Azavea, 2010) and other problems derived from the redrawing of congressional districts in states with constitutional requirements on districts' contiguity and compactness (Crocker, 2012). The definitions of each variable are explained in Figure 1. Each measure quantifies the degree of compactness of congressional districts based on different benchmarks and reports values that range from 0 to 1, 1 being a district with perfect compactness and arguably not gerrymandered. The Polsby-Popper ratio and the Schwartzberg ratio quantify the level of indentation of the district d (i.e., how smooth or contorted the boundaries of a district are). The Area to Convex Hull ratio and the Reock ratio measure the degree of the district's dispersion (i.e., the extent to which the shape of a district is spread out from its center). Finally, we construct a **Gerrymandering Index** that aggregates the four measures presented in Figure 1 using the minimum of their standardized values. The motivation for taking the minimum deviation from the respective mean as our index of Gerrymandering is not only that negative deviations imply less compact boundaries, but also that the manipulation could occur in multiple dimensions.

4.3 Independent variables

Based on Ludington (1911) and Engstrom and Kernell (2014), we construct a dummy variable that equals one if the state s at election year t had adopted state-printed ballots in *all* the counties of its territory. We call this variable *SecretBallot* _{s,t} . Based on this measure, we construct an additional variable that equals one if the state s had adopted the state-printed ballot but *did not allow* for any special method of voting a straight-party ticket, and we refer to this variable as *SecretBallot NPO* _{s,t} .

4.4 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics. The variables are presented in three panels, depending on whether they vary at the county and presidential election year, district and congressional election year, or county levels. In each panel, we also describe variables for the full set of elections and for the elections before and after the first adoption of the secret ballot (i.e., excluding periods of reversals and reintroduction of reforms). Figure 2 shows the state-by-state coding of the ballot reforms from 1880 to 1920, and Figure 3

⁴See, for instance, how plaintiffs use the criterion of compactness to justify their cases here: <http://redistricting.ils.edu>

presents the geographical distribution of newspapers in 1888 at the county level.

5 Empirical framework

5.1 Basic facts and reduced-form evidence

We begin with a simple regression analysis which shows the correlations of the ballot reform with the proxies of democratization defined in Section 4.2.

5.1.1 *The design of the state-printed ballots and vote secrecy*

The introduction of the state-printed ballots certainly hindered the process of mobilizing and monitoring voters, but it did not make it impossible for the political machines. When the reformed paper ballots included (in addition to candidate lists) party logos, party circles, or any option to vote a straight-party ticket (see Appendix Figure A2), the paper ballots were easily checked by machine-hired personnel at the polls. Moreover, citizens who were willing to sell their vote anyway could be easily trained to vote for the same party again and again (Reed, 2014).⁵ In fact, this apparent minor modification generated significant opposition from other groups of citizens who argued that this adjustment was serving the political machine to continue its manipulation of the illiterate and the non-English-speakers during elections (Allen, 1910; Rusk, 1970).

Bearing this in mind, we focus our analysis on the effect of secret ballot *without* the straight-ticket option. Our independent variable, *SecretBallot NPO*, has two advantages. First, it captures more accurately the moment in which voters could cast their ballots privately, frustrating training and monitoring processes. Second, it helps us to identify the moments in which the political machine puts serious efforts into reversing the reform and its consequences.⁶

To support our approach and the first advantage of our independent variable, we run a set of regressions relating the ballot reform and the dependent variables defined in Section 4.2. Table 2 present the results.

In columns 1 to 3, we can see that what mattered the most for the voting behavior was not the adoption of state-printed ballots by itself (Panel B) but that those ballots did not include any particular option for casting a straight party ticket (Panel A). In fact,

⁵As Reed (2014) notes: “Despite the advantages of the new Australian ballot system, it is clear that some party leaders had concerns about turnout and voter error among various constituencies under the new laws. The new system of secret voting represented a rather dramatic shift away from the older, more public party-strip balloting system to which many voters had been accustomed. [...] For this reason, many party leaders took steps to educate their voters about the new laws and distributing sample ballots in place of the old party tickets”.

⁶We are not the only ones who have highlighted the relevance of the ballot design in this electoral reform. Reed (2014); Engstrom and Kernell (2014) and Rusk (1970) have studied the influence of the layout of electoral tickets on turnout and split-ticket voting. For instance, Reed (2014) and Engstrom and Kernell (2014) show that the decline in turnout seems to be driven by states that adopted the Australian ballot using paper ballots with candidates ordered in Office Blocks instead of Party columns. Even though we also study voter participation, our definition of vote secrecy does not make a distinction between Office Block and Party column layouts. In other words, in our case, if a state adopted the Australian ballot using an office block design, but it allowed a particular option to cast a straight party ticket, we code our dummy variable as zero.

once we control for county- and year-fixed effects, the conditional correlation of the secret ballot with straight-party option and the voting behavior is not only statistically insignificant but also close to zero. In contrast, the secret ballot *without* the straight-party option is associated with: 1) less turnout, 2) higher levels of split-ticket voting, and 3) lower vote shares for the dominant parties. In the case of the electoral strategies presented in columns 4 and 5, the differences are less stark. With or without the straight-party ticket option, the secret ballot correlates with less voter intimidation. For the Gerrymandering index, the coefficients are negative but not statistically significant. However, the magnitude of the correlation is five times larger when using the definition without the straight-party ticket option. Overall, state-printed ballots without the straight-party correlate more strongly with changes in voter and politician behavior.

To support the second advantage of our independent variable, we run another set of estimations to explore the relevance of the timing of vote secrecy. As shown in Figure 2, none of the states abandoned state-printed ballots once implemented. However, multiple states set back or delayed the abolition of the straight-ticket voting. Taking this into account, we regress our outcome variables on three indicator functions generated from the possible stages displayed in Figure 2, namely the years when the “First Secret Ballot” took place, the years when the state experienced a “Reform Reversal,” and the period when a “Second Secret Ballot” was adopted. Figure A3 illustrates these variables using the state of California as an example.⁷ These regressions include, besides the aforementioned indicators, county and election year-fixed effects (or congressional district-fixed effects as appropriate), while the omitted category is set to be the period before the adoption of the first secret ballot.

Figure 4 reports the results. There are two takeaways from this exercise. First, some of the positive impacts of the secret ballot vanished during the stages of reversal, revealing the possible attempts of the political machine to overcome the initial reform. In the case of the split-ticket voting, for example, the withdrawal of vote secrecy reduces the splitting to the pre-reform levels; after the second adoption, the variable increases again to the levels following the first reform. Furthermore, the decline in turnout – associated with a decrease in the mobilization of voters – completely vanishes and even shifts to an increase in attendance during the reversal period. Second, the main impact of the reform seems to occur during the first adoption of the secret ballot and not afterward. The coefficients for the first attempt are not just more precise but often larger in magnitude than the point estimates coming from the second attempt, showing a potential adaptation of voters and political machines to the initial reform. One exception is the vote share for the dominant party, where the point estimates are increasing in magnitude (though not significantly different to each other).

⁷Notice that the first election with a secret ballot in California was held in 1894, and then the state experienced a reform reversal in 1904 and a new adoption in 1912.

The latter results also highlight one challenge for our identification strategy. The reasons why some states exhibited reversals and others not are likely to be endogenous to the electoral results after the first adoption of the vote secrecy. To avoid endogeneity biases derived from the reversals, in what follows, we restrict our sample in each state to the elections covering only the years before and after the introduction of the first secret ballot.⁸

5.2 Identification strategy

To assess the importance of the media in the success of vote secrecy and its impact on democratization, we follow a difference-in-difference identification strategy that exploits the variation in the adoption of the secret ballot and the levels of media penetration across states and time. More specifically, this approach allows us to test whether – relative to outcome patterns before the adoption of the vote secrecy – counties with more newspapers exhibited higher turnout rates, less partisan attachment, and smaller vote shares for the dominant parties after introducing the electoral reform. The baseline specification for outcome y in county c , state s and election year t is given by:

$$y_{c,s,t} = \delta_c + \delta_t + \alpha \cdot \text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} + \beta \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \epsilon_{c,s,t}, \quad (5)$$

where δ_c represents a set of county-fixed effects capturing non-time-varying county-specific characteristics affecting $y_{c,s,t}$ and δ_t denotes a set of election-year fixed effects corresponding to presidential elections from 1820 to 1920.⁹ In (5), outcomes $y_{c,s,t}$ are turnout, split-ticket voting or the vote share of the dominant party defined in equations (1)-(3), and $\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t}$ is a dummy variable equal to one if county c in state s had adopted the Australian Ballot (i.e., the state-printed ballot) without a straight-party ticket option during election year t . Finally, $\text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888}$ denotes the number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered in county c by 1888.¹⁰

The identification assumption here is a parallel trend presumption, requiring temporal trend in voting behavior to be the same in the absence of vote secrecy. This assumption, though not directly testable, can be validated using the additional econometric exercises that we describe in Section 5.3.

Regarding the electoral strategy outcomes, which vary at district and congressional election levels, we estimate an analogous model to equation (5) that allows us to test whether districts with more media penetration after the adoption of secret ballots report less voter intimidation and less manipulation of their congressional district

⁸This corresponds to the definitions of Pre 1st secret and 1st secret in Figure A3

⁹The proposed specifications are more demanding than just including state-fixed effects. We chose this specification to account for the idiosyncratic variation in the outcome variables and the newspapers at the county or district level. All the results, however, are robust to the inclusion of state-fixed effects.

¹⁰Since the decision of redistricting depends primarily on the district's total population, all specifications of electoral strategies include contemporaneous total population interacted with the dummy of the Secret Ballot, as additional control.

boundaries.¹¹

Finally, to correctly estimate the standard errors in our regressions, we account for two critical issues. First, we recognize that errors are correlated across observations in the same state because the secret ballot indicator is the same for all counties in a given year, generating the “Moulton (1990) problem”. Second, it may be the case that errors are strongly correlated over time as a result of idiosyncratic regional trends. Thus, following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Moulton (1990), all our specifications, unless otherwise noted, use standard errors clustered at the state level. This variance estimation allows us to control for an arbitrary correlation within states in both dimensions while assuming independence of unobserved characteristics across states.

5.3 Threats to identification

We now turn to a discussion of the identification issues in the estimation of equation (5) and its analog at the district level. Given the similar notation between specifications, we focus exclusively on the former one to address these issues. Everything in this Section, however, is analogous when using the data at the congressional district level.

5.3.1 Omitted time-varying confounding factors and potential anticipation:

Even when using only the first adoption of the secret ballot discussed in Section 5.1, state legislatures do not adopt electoral reforms randomly (Besley & Case, 2000; Aghion et al., 2004; Trebbi et al., 2008). One natural concern here is that there could be omitted time-varying factors closely related to our outcome variables that also independently influenced the adoption of the vote secrecy in the first place. To address this concern, we propose three validation exercises to support our identification strategy.

First, if there are omitted factors that could explain the adoption of the reform, we would expect, for instance, differences in the pre-treatment period or anticipation effects before the year of adoption. To check this, we extend the model (5) to validate the absence of pre-trends running:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{c,s,t} = & \delta_c + \delta_t + \alpha_1 \cdot \text{PreSecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}-1} + \alpha_2 \cdot \text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} \\ & + \beta_1 \cdot \left(\text{PreSecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}-1} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) \\ & + \beta_2 \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \epsilon_{c,s,t} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

¹¹In particular, we estimate $y_{d,s,t} = \eta_d + \eta_t + \gamma \cdot \text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} + \lambda \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} \times \text{Newspapers}_{d,t=1888} \right) + \epsilon_{d,s,t}$, where η_d denotes a set of congressional district-fixed effects and η_t denotes a set of election-year fixed effects corresponding to congressional elections from 1880 to 1920. Similar to equation (5), $y_{d,s,t}$ represents voter intimidation or one of the Gerrymandering measures. Notice that, in this case, the newspapers variable aggregates county-level information to the district level, fixing figures and boundaries in 1888. Furthermore, given that one of the most important drivers of redistricting is the evolution of population counts, in all regressions for Gerrymandering we include the interaction between the time-varying value of the population in t and the secret ballot dummy.

The notation here is analogous to (5). However, *PreSecretBallot* $NPO_{s,\bar{t}-1}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for county c (within state s) in the election $\bar{t} - 1$, where $\bar{t}$ is the year in which the county implemented its first secret ballot without straight-ticket voting. If the parallel trend assumption holds, α_1 and β_1 must not be statistically different from zero.

Second, if the omitted confounding factors are the consequence of the idiosyncratic evolution of each state adopting the electoral reform, our results could be driven by these trends. We take this possibility seriously and therefore include in all our specifications state-specific linear time trends ($\rho_s \cdot t$).

This econometric specification allows treatment and control regions to follow ‘different trends in a limited but potentially revealing way’ for identification (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, p. 238). Note that even if two states were sharing the same trend, this exercise could capture that aggregate behavior of both regions as well.¹²

Finally, it may be the case that the initial conditions for each county and particular trends of our outcome variables explain the results. For instance, the secret ballot could have been adopted in places with high vote shares for the dominant parties or in areas with high levels of turnout that also differed in terms of other characteristics. In that scenario, the initial conditions and pre-adoption trends will invalidate the parallel trend assumption. To address this concern, we control for pre-adoption outcomes. In particular, we estimate:

$$y_{c,s,t} = \delta_c + \delta_t + \alpha \cdot SecretBallot\ NPO_{s,t} + \beta \cdot \left(SecretBallot\ NPO_{s,t} \times Newspapers_{c,t=1888} \right) + \gamma \cdot \left(PreAdoption\ y_{c,t=1888} \times t \right) + \epsilon_{c,s,t}, \quad (7)$$

where *PreAdoption* $y_{c,t=1888}$ is the arithmetic average of the outcome variable $y_{c,t}$ during the elections when there was no ballot reform in any state (i.e for $t \in \{1880, 1884, 1888\}$). Similarly, in regressions using congressional elections, the pre-period average is over $t = \{1880, 1882, 1884, 1886, 1888\}$

6 Results

6.1 Are more newspapers related with a greater diversity of views?

We begin our analysis by examining the relationship between the number of newspapers per capita in 1888 and the diversity of political views covered by those media outlets. If the media was always captured by one political party, more newspapers are not necessarily associated with more diversity of views. We examine this possibility using

¹²The state-specific intercept is captured by the county-fixed effects. Thus, $\delta_c + \rho_s \cdot t$ correspond to state trends with multiple intercepts at county level.

data at the county level by running regressions of the form:

$$MediaConcentration_{c,s,t=1888} = \delta_s + \lambda \cdot Newspapers_{c,t=1888} + \sum_{m=1}^M \rho_m \cdot X_{c,t=1888}^m + \epsilon_{c,s,t}, \quad (8)$$

where δ_s represent state-fixed effects, $\{X_{c,t=1888}^m\}_{m=1}^M$ a set of controls at the county level fixed at 1888, and $MediaConcentration_{c,s,t=1888}$ is either an indicator variable equal to one if there are at least two newspapers of distinct partisan attachments, or a Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on the number (or the circulation) of Democratic, Republican, and other media outlets.

Table 3 present the results in three panels. Panel A shows the results using all the counties, whereas Panels B and C display the results for southern and non-southern states, respectively.¹³ Overall, the estimates suggest that more newspapers in 1888 are associated with a greater diversity of views and that such a relationship holds regardless of the sample of counties considered.

6.2 Baseline results and validating the identification assumption

We turn next to the baseline results. Panel A in Table 4 presents the coefficients for the baseline specifications. The odd columns present the estimated models using the full sample of elections while the even columns consider just the elections before and after the adoption of the first secret ballot (that is, excluding periods of reversals and reintroduction of reforms). We demeaned the variable of the newspapers before computing the interaction terms to facilitate the interpretation of the direct effect.

The comparison between odd and even columns supports the concern about the endogeneity of the reversals and second adoptions presented in Section 5.1.1. For the even columns, the interaction coefficients are larger than those shown in the odd columns, highlighting the downward bias generated by the inclusion of periods when the political machine could have revoked the reform. Not restricting the sample not only biases the estimates but also reduces precision in the estimated parameters. In the case of the voter behavior outcomes, for example, the statistical significance of the interaction coefficients decreases once we employ the full sample of elections.

There are several takeaways from these panels.

First of all, areas with higher levels of media penetration, measured as the number of newspapers per thousand population in 1888, increased and reinforced the positive consequences of the secret ballot. More specifically, those areas displayed additional increments in split-ticket voting and further declines in support of dominant parties. Furthermore, they seem to compensate for the negative outcomes of the ballot reform, counterbalancing the documented decline in turnout and the increasing levels of Ger-

¹³We code as southern states the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

rymandering. We did not find a significant decrease in voter intimidation, but the estimated coefficients have the expected sign.

The magnitude of the latter effects is also meaningful. An increase of one additional newspaper per thousand population in 1888 leads to an increase of approximately 8% in turnout after the introduction of the secret ballot. Moreover, the same increase in publications is associated with a 6.3% decline in the vote share for the dominant party and an expansion of the split-ticket voting of 6.4%.

Likewise, in the regressions at the district level, one additional newspaper per thousand population in 1888 is associated with an increase of approximately 0.075 points in the minimum deviation of compactness of congressional districts after the adoption of the secret ballot. This effect corresponds to a 15% increase with respect to the sample mean of the Gerrymandering index (recall this reflects an increase in compactness and, therefore, a decrease in Gerrymandering).

Checking for pre-trends: To support the identification assumption in Panel B of Table 4, we check for pre-trends using the exercise defined by equation (6). Here, we find no evidence of anticipation effects in any of the outcome variables considered. Figure 5 presents the extended version of the same exercise defined in detail by the following equation

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{c,s,t} = & c + \delta_c + \delta_t + \sum_{l=1}^{\tau} \alpha_l \cdot \text{PreSecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}-l} + \sum_{k=0}^{\tau} \alpha_k \cdot \text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}+k} \\
& + \sum_{l=1}^{\tau} \beta_l \cdot \left(\text{PreSecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}-l} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) \\
& + \sum_{k=0}^{\tau} \beta_k \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}+k} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \epsilon_{c,s,t} \quad (9)
\end{aligned}$$

These figures use multiple leads and lags, setting a window of 8 years pre- and post-reform. We include both 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals for each of the coefficients. These graphs document three empirical facts: (1) the non-existence of pre-trends for all the outcome variables; (3) the absence of significant results for voter intimidation; (3) and finally the timing of the effects, which are immediate for the split-ticket voting, short-lived for the vote shares of dominant parties, and persistent for the extent of Gerrymandering.

Controlling for pre-adoption trends in the outcome variables: Even columns in Table A2 present the coefficients of interest after controlling for pre-adoption trends on our outcome variables. These results support the identification assumption. There is no evidence that the pre-adoption conditions within counties or districts have driven our results.¹⁴

¹⁴Even though the procedure of controlling for pre-treatment outcomes has been used in the literature for a while, there is

6.3 Robustness Checks

6.3.1 Is it the adoption of state-printed ballots or the further exclusion of the straight-party ticket that matters?

We begin this section by exploring the differential effects of the electoral reform and its interaction with our measure of media penetration depending on the definition of the secret ballot. In particular, we run:

$$y_{c,s,t} = \delta_c + \delta_t + \alpha_1 \cdot \text{SecretBallot}_{s,t} + \alpha_2 \cdot \text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} + \beta_1 \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot}_{s,t} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \beta_2 \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \epsilon_{c,s,t} \quad (10)$$

Where the independent variables follow the definitions described in Section 4.3. This specification allows us to separately identify the effect of the state-printed ballot and the additional option of the straight-party ticket. We present the results of this model in Table 5. We corroborate that – in line with results in Table 2 – for all the outcomes defined in Section 4.2, the results are mostly driven by the adoption of state-printed ballots *without* the straight-party ticket option. These results highlight the relevance of ballot design for the study of vote secrecy and the process of democratization and support our focus concerning this particular definition of secret ballot for the US.

6.3.2 Alternative interpretations

In this section, we address the concern that our estimates are driven by factors other than media penetration. We consider three alternative hypotheses highlighted in the literature on democratization. In particular, we examine the urbanization, modernization, and disenfranchisement hypotheses, and test for the significance of these issues by estimating:

$$y_{c,t} = \delta_c + \delta_t + \alpha \cdot \text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} + \beta \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \sum_i \eta_i \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,t} \times \text{Alternative Story}_{i,c,t=1888} \right) + \epsilon_{c,t}, \quad (11)$$

where $\text{Alternative Story}_{i,c,t=1888}$ are county characteristics fixed at 1888.¹⁵ In what follows, we present those alternatives and the variables used to test them.

Urbanization hypothesis: Some scholars have argued that the process of democratization around the world has been promoted by the densification and centralization of urban areas (Barnett, 2014; Glaeser & Steinberg, 2017). They claim that cities facilitate the coordination of public action and drive institutional development by reducing the

recent evidence that suggests that this may not be a good idea. See for instance Chabé-Ferret (2017)

¹⁵We could have controlled for the same factors varying across time. However, this could generate an additional problem of “bad controls” if those variables responded to the Secret Ballot and Newspapers as well.

cost of mobilization. Our results using the number of newspapers may have captured this effect because cities and highly populated areas tend to have, on average, more media access and coverage than other places. To rule out this possibility, we use the following variables as interacted controls: total population, the percentage of the population in locations with 2,500 or more inhabitants, and the percentage of the population in areas with 25,000 or more residents.¹⁶

Immigration and the disenfranchisement hypothesis: It may be the case that the national shock of foreign immigration or the attempts of disenfranchisement of some groups –which partially pressured the introduction of the secret ballot in the first place– induced the changes in our outcome variables (Engstrom & Kernell, 2014; Evans, 1917; Keyssar, 2009). In particular, nationalist and racist movements could have played an important role in changing electoral outcomes, and arguably, the content and availability of media. To check this hypothesis, we use the proportions of foreign-born population, White people, and men in the county as additional interacted controls.

Modernization hypothesis: Similarly, modernization theory (see, for example, Aidt & Jensen, 2017) claims that economic activity and industrialization – rather than political incentives – were responsible for the democratization process in the US.¹⁷ If that were the case, the same economic forces that lead to economic growth would explain the adoption of the secret ballot, media penetration, and the change in our outcome variables. Consequently, controlling for economic activity in urban and rural areas is necessary to ensure that they are not confounding our results. To do so, we examine the additional effect of the farm and manufacturing outputs per capita at the county level.¹⁸

The results of these exercises for the main outcomes are reported in Table 6 (Table A1 reports the results for each individual measure of district compactness). To provide a benchmark for comparison, and given that there is no data for some regions, on odd columns we run the baseline specification with the restricted sample for which we have the full set of controls. On even columns, we present our preferred specification. Even when these variables are relevant to the outcomes of interest, none of them drive our results. Besides, controlling for these variables increases the precision of interaction coefficients and the overall fit of the model.

6.3.3 Endogeneity of newspapers

Another concern with this empirical strategy is the possibility that media penetration was endogenous to the process of electoral reform and the evolution of electoral outcomes for more subtle reasons than were considered in Section 6.3.2. For example, it

¹⁶Even though we use the number of newspapers per thousand people, controlling for this variables is essential because two places with the same value of media penetration could have very different population densities.

¹⁷For a critical view of this hypothesis, see Robinson, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Yared (2009)

¹⁸Notice that aggregate trends in economic activity at the state level are also accounted for once we include the state-specific time trends.

may be the case that places with more newspapers in 1888 were precisely the areas where the political machine was the strongest (i.e., regions where parties were able to capture the media and manipulate elections).

To approach this issue, we consider an instrumental variable procedure that exploits a potential exogenous source of variation in the availability of newspapers. To do so, we predict the number of publications using the relative potential for wood-pulp production of each county based on data from the agricultural census of 1880, the year that wood-based paper technology started to be broadly available to paper mills in the US. In particular, we run the following first-stage model for the main independent variable:

$$\begin{aligned}
SecretBallot\ NPO_{s,t} \times Newspapers_{c,t=1888} &= \delta_c + \delta_t \\
&+ \rho_0 \cdot SecretBallot\ NPO_{s,t} \\
&+ \rho_1 \cdot \left(SecretBallot\ NPO_{s,t} \times WoodPulpPotential_{c,t=1880} \right) \\
&+ \rho_2 \cdot \left(Secret\ Ballot\ NPO_{s,t} \times WoodPulpPotential_{c,t=1880}^2 \right) \\
&+ \epsilon_{c,t}.
\end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

In this equation, $WoodPulpPotential_{c,t=1880}$ is defined as the number of unimproved acres of woodland and forests in county c in 1880. We use a quadratic specification to capture potential non-linearities in the extraction of the natural resource and, following [Dieterle and Snell \(2016\)](#), to capture the potential heterogeneity of the instrument.

Prior to 1850, paper in the US was fabricated exclusively using cotton or linen rags. The process was expensive, and it was not until 1854 that the patent of the wood-pulp paper started to present alternatives to the existing papermaking methods. However, as [Weichelt \(2016\)](#) points out: “The switch from rag-based to wood-based paper was slow and uneven. [...] mill owners delayed the switch because of costs. Wood-pulp technology was protected under exclusive patent rights and so did not become widely available until the 1880s.” Still, once the technology was available after the patents expired, it was responsible for a significant decrease in the price of paper production, and hence, the cost of publishing ([Smith, 1964](#)). For instance, [Weeks \(1916\)](#) explains that, because of the shift from rags to timber, the price of newspaper dropped steadily from four cents in 1869 to two cents in 1900.

Paper mills used to be located in places where they could easily acquire the raw material from the immediate vicinity ([Smith, 1964](#); [Toivanen, 2004](#)). Therefore, the presence of wood-paper mills, the cost of producing paper, and hence, the likelihood of having more newspapers in a given county, was closely related to the woodland coverage that existed when the new technology was made available.¹⁹

¹⁹The relationship, however, may be nonlinear and could depend on the initial allocation of woodland and previous patterns of exploration of the resource.

The exclusion restriction of this instrument requires that, once we control for the election year and county-specific characteristics, the only channel through which the number of unimproved acres of woodland and forests in county c is related to electoral outcomes after the introduction of secret ballots is through its impact on the production of newspapers. This assumption is plausible since the machines could not easily anticipate the introduction of this new technology and its multiple variants, nor had any obvious influence on the woodland cover composition in farms in 1880.

Tables 7 and 8 report the results of this exercise. Each panel corresponds to a different outcome variable. To provide a criterion for comparison, in column 1, we present the OLS estimates for the baseline specification using the sample with information on the instrument. In Panel C, we also include the full set of controls used in Table 6 given that controlling for those variables gives us more precise estimates in the baseline specification. Again, we demean the number of newspapers before interacting with the secret ballot dummy to interpret the coefficients easily. For the same reason, the wood-pulp potential variable is standardized before computing the interaction.

In column 2, we present the IV estimates. These are qualitatively similar to the results in column 1. However, the point estimates are twice as large as their OLS counterpart. Measurement error is a likely explanation for this difference. Our variable of media penetration is based only on the number of weekly and daily newspapers per thousand population in a given county, which may capture with some noise true circulation in the population as well as correlated penetration of other types of publications like magazines. Another potential explanation derives from the fact that this IV approach captures a local average treatment effect, capturing the effect of the secret ballot in those places where the wood-pulp technology fostered the production of printed media because of the exogenous potential of the region in terms of available woodland.

The first stage, presented in column 4, reveals that the instrument is a substantial and meaningful predictor of the endogenous regressor. The estimated parameters are highly significant and follow the expected signs. They reveal a nonlinear convex function on the number of unimproved acres of woodland and forests. Besides, the F-statistic for the excluded instruments in all panels is comfortably above 20, suggesting a robust and reliable first stage (Stock & Yogo, 2005). The reduced form estimates are shown in column 3.

7 Southern vs. Non-Southern States

We end by examining the implications of the fundamental differences between Southern and Non-Southern states before the introduction of the electoral reform on the effects of the secret ballot. Table 9 shows that counties in the South were 47% less likely to have at least two partisan media outlets and 6.3 percentage points less literate than the

non-southern regions. Given these differences, the media in the South was less effective and, if sufficiently biased, perhaps potentially harmful in the post reform period.

Moreover, as only one-tenth of southerners lived in urban areas during this period, and transportation between cities was difficult [McPherson \(2003\)](#), civil mobilization was harder to consolidate against political machines in the South and, thus, less likely to occur in this part of the country. Finally, southern voters faced many more restrictions other than simply lack of vote secrecy, and as [Engstrom and Kernell \(2014, p. 6\)](#) point out,

From the late 1880s on, a regime of highly restrictive electoral rules disenfranchised whole blocs of the electorate, turning the South into a one-party region that was non-responsive to national political forces.

In short, in the South a number of obstacles decreased the likelihood that both the media could mobilize voters and that the new ballot could effectively increase voter freedom. Bearing all these elements in mind, we explore the heterogeneous effects of our baseline specification by the location of the constituencies between South and Non-South states. Table 10 presents the results. We verify that the media's positive effects are mostly driven by non-southern counties, where the newspapers were less captured and the population was more literate and arguably more able to mobilize against the political machines ([Engstrom & Kernell, 2014](#); [Gentzkow et al., 2014](#)).

Altogether, these results support the hypothesis that the underlining mechanism through which media mattered was the diffusion of information and the generation of political accountability in areas where civil mobilization was a real threat to the political machine.

8 Conclusions

This paper contributes to understanding the role of the media in the effectiveness of institutional reforms and the selection and response of politicians facing those changes.

We focus our analysis on the introduction of secret voting in the United States and how the newspapers were fundamental to achieve the positive consequences of the electoral reform at the end of the 19th century.

We present a simple conceptual framework and test its theoretical expectations using a simple empirical approach. Our identification strategy relies on a difference-in-difference estimation strategy exploiting variation in the adoption of vote secrecy and the levels of media penetration across states and time.

Our results indicate that the press helped to foster the democratic process promoting partisan detachment and decreasing support for dominant parties. Furthermore, it undermined the manipulation of electoral boundaries and the declines in turnout

unintentionally incentivized with the reform. We do not find statistical evidence in favor of the role of the media on reducing voter intimidation.

We show that our results are not likely driven by omitted time-varying factors or anticipation, nor are they explained by state-specific time trends or initial outcome conditions. The primary results are also robust to the exploration of three alternative explanations: modernization, urbanization, and the immigrant-disenfranchisement hypothesis. Moreover, they are qualitatively similar when addressing the potential endogeneity of newspaper presence using an instrumental variable approach.

Confirming the idea that these findings are explained by a better-informed and mobilized citizenry, our effects are mostly concentrated in non-southern states, places with less monopolized media, and areas with high literacy rates.

Our analysis highlights the importance of institutional complementarity. In particular, the findings imply that democratic institutions are complementary to each other, and that improvements in one dimension require other functional dimensions to be fully effective. In our study, electoral reform increasing voter freedom at the polls improves the quality of democracy especially if an active press is present as a reinforcing input. This complementarity is particularly relevant when losers of the reform actively seek to counteract its effects.

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Figure 1: Measures of compactness of congressional districts

$$\text{Polsby-Popper}_{d,t} = \frac{4\pi \cdot (\text{District Area}_{d,t})}{\text{District Perimeter}_{d,t}^2}$$

It compares the area of the district to the area of a circle whose circumference is equal to the perimeter of the district.

$$\text{Schwartzberg}_{d,t} = \frac{2\pi \cdot \sqrt{\frac{\text{District Area}_{d,t}}{\pi}}}{\text{District Perimeter}_{d,t}}$$

It compares the perimeter of the district to the circumference of a circle whose area is equal to the area of the district.

$$\text{Convex Hull}_{d,t} = \frac{\text{District Area}_{d,t}}{\text{Convex Hull Area}_{d,t}}$$

It compares the district area with the area of the minimum convex polygon that enclose the district.

$$\text{Reock}_{d,t} = \frac{\text{District Area}_{d,t}}{\text{Area of circle enclosing d in t}}$$

It compares the district area with the area of the minimum bounding circle enclosing the district.

Figure 2: Coding of the Secret Ballot

Figure 3: Media penetration in 1888

Note: Data at county level of the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888. State boundaries are in black.

Figure 4: The adoption of the Secret Ballot without straight party ticket and its reversals

Note: Point estimates and 90% and 95% confidence intervals obtained from the estimated values of γ 's in the model $y_{ct} = \alpha + \delta_c + \delta_t + \gamma_1(1st\ Secret_{ct}) + \gamma_2(Reversal_{ct}) + \gamma_3(2nd\ Secret_{ct}) + e_{ct}$. Outcome variables y_{ct} correspond to the title of each panel and are defined in section 4.2. Definitions of the variables included are explained using the state of California as example in Figure A3. The models for Voter Intimidation and Gerrymandering Index include district fixed effects instad of county fixed effects. The omitted category in all the regressions is the period before the first secret ballot (Pre 1st Secret).

Figure 5: Event-studies: checking for anticipation and timing effects

Note: Point estimates and 90% and 95% confidence intervals corresponding to the estimated betas in the following regression:

$$y_{c,t} = c + \delta_c + \delta_t + \sum_{l=1}^{\tau} \alpha_l \cdot \text{PreSecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}-l} + \sum_{k=0}^{\tau} \alpha_k \cdot \text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}+k} + \sum_{l=1}^{\tau} \beta_l \cdot \left(\text{PreSecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}-l} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \sum_{k=0}^{\tau} \beta_k \cdot \left(\text{SecretBallot NPO}_{s,\bar{t}+k} \times \text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888} \right) + \epsilon_{c,t}$$

Outcome variables y_{ct} correspond to the title of each panel and are defined in section 4.2. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. $\text{Newspapers}_{c,t=1888}$ refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county or congressional district level.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Varying at county and presidential election year level					
<i>Full Sample of elections</i>					
-Turnout	0.697	0.202	0.030	1	17,793
-Split ticket voting	0.038	0.065	0	0.813	17,910
-Vote share dominant party	0.585	0.144	0.010	0.988	16,918
<i>Election pre and post first Secret Ballot</i>					
-Turnout	0.701	0.200	0.03	1	15,759
-Split ticket voting	0.036	0.063	0	0.813	15,827
-Vote share dominant party	0.588	0.141	0.010	0.988	15,034
Varying at district and congressional election year level					
<i>Full Sample of elections</i>					
-Gerrymandering Index	-0.501	1.022	-5.656	1.886	5,908
-Voter Intimidation	0.006	0.077	0	1	5,908
-Polsby Popper	0.314	0.161	0.002	0.756	5,908
-Schwartzberg	0.536	0.166	0.044	0.87	5,908
-Area to Convex Hull	0.755	0.119	0.171	0.983	5,908
-Reock	0.397	0.112	0.039	0.71	5,908
<i>Election pre and post first Secret Ballot</i>					
-Gerrymandering Index	-0.500	0.974	-4.673	1.771	5,302
-Voter Intimidation	0.007	0.081	0	1	5,302
-Polsby Popper	0.314	0.16	0.002	0.756	5,302
-Schwartzberg	0.535	0.166	0.044	0.87	5,302
-Area to Convex Hull	0.755	0.116	0.171	0.983	5,302
-Reock	0.399	0.11	0.039	0.71	5,302
Varying at county level					
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
-Newspapers in 1888 (per thousand population)	0.211	0.216	0.023	5.068	1,969
-Wood-pulp potential (acres in 1880)	85,785	75,954	0	631,885	1,944
<i>Controls: Average of the values from 1880, 1884 and 1888</i>					
- Total Population	21,210	18,747	583	163,045	1,969
-% Population in Places with 2,500 or + inh.	10.739	17.864	0	93.14	1,969
-% Population in Places with 25,000 or + inh.	1.921	10.143	0	92.966	1,969
-% White population	84.907	21.755	7.282	100	1,969
-% Male population	52.066	3.491	46.075	83.133	1,969
- Manufacturing Output Per Capita	41.9	59.112	0	666.203	1,969
- Farm Output Per Capita	48.058	25.057	0.879	340.792	1,969
- Foreign Born Population	2,267	4,285	0	51,269	1,969
Varying at district level					
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
-Newspapers in 1888 (per thousand population)	0.123	0.098	0.002	0.667	349
-Wood-pulp potential (acres in 1880)	748,819	811,783	0	5,383,054	349
<i>Controls: Average of the values from 1880, 1882, 1884, 1886 and 1888</i>					
- Total Population	163,099	9,910	79,825	219,884	349
-% Population in Places with 2,500 or + inh.	16.117	6.072	9.137	72.31	349
-% Population in Places with 25,000 or + inh.	4.814	5.209	0	70.553	349
-% White population	86.789	7.533	78.64	99.727	349
-% Male population	51.225	0.563	48.955	52.15	349
- Manufacturing Output Per Capita	64.429	21.196	43.352	230.579	349
- Farm Output Per Capita	46.67	4.13	20.935	77.674	349
- Foreign Born Population	17,498	3,663	11,947	65,378	349

Table 2: Ballot reforms, voting behavior and electoral strategies

Dependent Variables:	Voting Behavior			Electoral Strategies	
	Turnout	Split Ticket Voting	Vote Share Dominant Party	Voter Intimidation	Gerrymandering Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A: Adoption of state-printed ballots without special straight-party option</i>					
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.0602 (0.0246)** [0.0044]***	0.0303 (0.0061)*** [0.0020]***	-0.0135 (0.0096) [0.0037]***	-0.0148 (0.0065)** [0.0050]***	-0.0566 (0.0532) [0.0549]
R-squared	0.7742	0.3067	0.5844	0.0832	0.7487
<i>Panel B: Adoption of state-printed ballots</i>					
Secret Ballot	0.0049 (0.0497) [0.0077]	-0.0012 (0.0096) [0.0029]	0.0064 (0.0244) [0.0070]	-0.0145 (0.0059)** [0.0053]***	-0.0158 (0.0817) [0.0753]
R-squared	0.7677	0.2906	0.5838	0.0825	0.7485
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	x	x
Congressional District Fixed Effects	x	x	x	✓	✓
Election Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	17,774	17,893	16,900	5,896	5,896

*Note: The unit of observation in Columns 1 to 3 is a county-presidential-election-year, while in Columns 4 and 5, the unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period is 1880 to 1920. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Secret Ballot is a dummy variable that is one when the state implemented the voting secrecy regardless of the format of the paper ballot. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Robust standard errors clustered at county level in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Table 3: Diversity of political views and newspapers in 1888

Dependent variable:	County has at least two partisan outlets		Herfindahl Index based on number of newspapers		Herfindahl Index based on newspapers' circulation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Full sample of counties</i>						
Newspapers in 1888	0.4717*** (0.1289)	0.3315*** (0.1189)	-0.1538*** (0.0555)	-0.1119** (0.0518)	-0.1260*** (0.0408)	-0.0838** (0.0357)
Observations	2,034	2,034	2,034	2,034	1,976	1,976
R-squared	0.4524	0.5940	0.4189	0.5611	0.3852	0.5115
<i>Panel B: South counties</i>						
Newspapers in 1888	1.0034*** (0.2331)	1.1018*** (0.2770)	-0.4196*** (0.0777)	-0.4620*** (0.0973)	-0.2422** (0.1040)	-0.3017** (0.1287)
Observations	738	738	738	738	698	698
R-squared	0.2638	0.3174	0.2079	0.2617	0.0869	0.1448
<i>Panel C: Non-south counties</i>						
Newspapers in 1888	0.3065*** (0.1069)	0.2296** (0.0886)	-0.0765* (0.0445)	-0.0680* (0.0375)	-0.0722* (0.0355)	-0.0690** (0.0328)
Observations	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,278	1,278
R-squared	0.2132	0.3359	0.1876	0.3064	0.1657	0.2591
<i>Common controls across specifications:</i>						
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Additional Covariates fixed at 1888:</i>						
- Total Population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % Population in Places with 2,500 or + inh.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % Population in Places with 25,000 or + inh.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % White population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % Male population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- Manufacturing Output Per Capita	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- Farm Output Per Capita	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- Foreign Born Population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Cross-section of Counties in 1888. Each panel corresponds to the subsample of counties used in the regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 4: Baseline results: Secret Ballot and the role of media, the impact on voter behavior and electoral strategies

Dependent Variable:	Voting Behavior						Electoral Strategies			
	Turnout		Split ticket voting		Vote Share Dominant Party		Voter Intimidation		Gerrymandering Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A: Difference-in-Differences estimates</i>										
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.0581*** (0.0167)	-0.0920*** (0.0275)	0.0206** (0.0088)	0.0193 (0.0127)	-0.0094 (0.0112)	-0.0162 (0.0168)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.026 (0.067)	0.019 (0.085)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.0439 (0.0300)	0.0802** (0.0370)	0.0227* (0.0133)	0.0641*** (0.0216)	-0.0430** (0.0201)	-0.0634** (0.0282)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.051** (0.019)	0.075*** (0.025)
R-squared	0.8402	0.8408	0.3361	0.3491	0.6025	0.6148	0.101	0.114	0.776	0.766
<i>Panel B: Checking for pre-trends</i>										
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.0528*** (0.0181)	-0.0940*** (0.0337)	0.0205** (0.0081)	0.0160 (0.0135)	-0.0128 (0.0095)	-0.0108 (0.0154)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.018 (0.070)	0.036 (0.089)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.0478 (0.0349)	0.0929** (0.0427)	0.0265* (0.0142)	0.0630*** (0.0224)	-0.0633*** (0.0190)	-0.0630** (0.0301)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.051** (0.020)	0.078*** (0.027)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO	0.0161 (0.0163)	-0.0051 (0.0212)	-0.0009 (0.0097)	-0.0058 (0.0101)	-0.0071 (0.0229)	0.0102 (0.0198)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.029 (0.029)	0.046 (0.033)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.0159 (0.0559)	0.0514 (0.0733)	0.0181 (0.0399)	-0.0017 (0.0351)	-0.1008 (0.0944)	-0.0043 (0.0684)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.012 (0.026)
R-squared	0.8404	0.8408	0.3362	0.3493	0.6034	0.6149	0.101	0.114	0.776	0.766
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x
Congressional District Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-specific time trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Elections Included	1880-1920	Pre and Post 1st Secret Ballot	1880-1920	Pre and Post 1st Secret Ballot	1880-1920	Pre and Post 1st Secret Ballot	1880-1920	Pre and Post 1st Secret Ballot	1880-1920	Pre and Post 1st Secret Ballot
Observations	17,774	15,738	17,893	15,810	16,900	15,015	5,887	5,282	5,887	5,282

Note: The unit of observation in Columns 1 to 6 is a county-presidential-election-year, while in Columns 7 to 10, the unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period is the one specified in the section row "Elections Included". Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county or congressional district level. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 5: Race between the adoption of the Secret ballot and the Secret ballot without a straight-party ticket option

Dependent variable:	Voting Behavior			Electoral Strategies	
	Split ticket Voting	Turnout	Vote Share Dominant Party	Voter intimidation	Gerrymandering Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Secret Ballot NPO	0.0110*** (0.0037)	-0.1055*** (0.0064)	-0.0080 (0.0066)	-0.0097 (0.0119)	-0.1876** (0.0754)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.0822*** (0.0105)	0.0710*** (0.0198)	-0.0706*** (0.0191)	-0.0015 (0.0034)	0.0912*** (0.0212)
Secret Ballot	-0.0101*** (0.0023)	0.0437*** (0.0041)	0.0016 (0.0040)	-0.0054 (0.0071)	-0.0124 (0.0440)
Secret Ballot × Newspapers in 1888	-0.0087 (0.0065)	-0.0105 (0.0130)	0.0044 (0.0110)	-0.0013 (0.0023)	-0.0229* (0.0139)
Election year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
County fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	x	x
Congressional District Fixed Effects	x	x	x	✓	✓
State-specific time trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	15,810	15,738	15,015	5,282	5,282
R-squared	0.2953	0.8165	0.6059	0.1064	0.7659

*Note: The unit of observation in Columns 1 to 3 is a county-presidential-election-year, while in Columns 4 and 5, the unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period includes all the elections pre and post the first adoption of the secret ballot. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county or congressional district level. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Table 6: Alternative interpretations

Dependent Variable:	Voting Behavior						Electoral Strategies			
	Turnout		Split ticket voting		Vote Share Dominant party		Voter intimidation		Gerrymandering Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.094*** (0.034)	-0.094** (0.036)	0.016 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0148 (0.0103)	-0.0156 (0.0104)	0.0363 (0.0887)	0.0825 (0.1028)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.093** (0.043)	0.097** (0.040)	0.063*** (0.022)	0.067*** (0.019)	-0.063** (0.030)	-0.049* (0.027)	-0.0028 (0.0043)	-0.0017 (0.0099)	0.0782*** (0.0270)	0.1209** (0.0514)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.010 (0.020)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.0090 (0.0101)	-0.0088 (0.0099)	0.0456 (0.0331)	0.0484 (0.0351)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.051 (0.073)	0.052 (0.071)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.033)	-0.004 (0.068)	-0.011 (0.067)	-0.0026 (0.0030)	-0.0030 (0.0027)	0.0119 (0.0261)	0.0103 (0.0244)
<i>Controlling using the interactions: (Secret Ballot NPO × Covariate)</i>										
<i>Where Covariate is:</i>										
- Total Population	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
- % Population in Places with 2,500 or + inhabitants	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
- % Population in Places with 25,000 or + inhabitants	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
- % White population	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
- % Male population	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
- Manufacturing Output Per Capita	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
- Farm Output Per Capita	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
- Foreign Born Population	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				
Congressional District Fixed Effects							✓	✓	✓	✓
Election Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-specific time trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	15,738	15,738	15,810	15,810	15,015	15,015	5,282	5,282	5,282	5,282
R-squared	0.841	0.841	0.349	0.349	0.615	0.616	0.1142	0.1152	0.7657	0.7677

Note: The unit of observation in Columns 1 to 6 is a county-presidential-election-year, while in Columns 7 to 10, the unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period includes all the elections pre and post the first adoption of the secret ballot. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county or congressional district level. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

**Table 7: Addressing other potential sources of endogeneity of newspaper presence
Voting behavior**

<i>Model:</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>IV</i>	<i>Reduced Form</i>	<i>First Stage</i>
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable:</i>		Turnout		Secret Ballot × Newspapers in 1888
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.0564* (0.0309)	-0.0657** (0.0286)	-0.0824** (0.0375)	-0.0369*** (0.0126)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.2866*** (0.0753)	0.5322*** (0.1233)		
Secret Ballot NPO × Wood-pulp potential			-0.0672*** (0.0157)	-0.1242*** (0.0200)
Secret Ballot NPO × (Wood-pulp potential) ²			0.0250** (0.0109)	0.0551*** (0.0125)
R-squared	0.7784	-	0.7785	0.3221
F	17.48	-	24.39	84.13
Observations	15,690	15,690	15,690	15,690
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable:</i>		Split ticket voting		Secret Ballot × Newspapers in 1888
Secret Ballot NPO	0.0250*** (0.0074)	0.0221*** (0.0071)	0.0144* (0.0079)	-0.0411*** (0.0126)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.0700** (0.0269)	0.1546*** (0.0396)		
Secret Ballot NPO × Wood-pulp potential			-0.0187*** (0.0063)	-0.1242*** (0.0200)
Secret Ballot NPO × (Wood-pulp potential) ²			0.0105*** (0.0037)	0.0550*** (0.0125)
R-squared	0.3215	-	0.3230	0.3158
F	9.735	-	14.17	80.93
Observations	15,505	15,505	15,505	15,505
<i>Panel C: Dependent variable:</i>		Vote Share Dominant Party		Secret Ballot × Newspapers in 1888
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.0224 (0.0145)	-0.0163 (0.0158)	-0.0064 (0.0196)	-0.0375*** (0.0127)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	-0.1247** (0.0504)	-0.2928*** (0.1080)		
Secret Ballot NPO × Wood-pulp potential			0.0365** (0.0154)	-0.1231*** (0.0194)
Secret Ballot NPO × (Wood-pulp potential) ²			-0.0140* (0.0082)	0.0537*** (0.0121)
R-squared	0.6018	-	0.6030	0.3204
F	5.752	-	6.551	58.07
Observations	14,745	14,745	14,745	14,745

*Note: The unit of observation is a county-presidential-election-year. The sample period includes all the elections pre and post the first adoption of the secret ballot. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county level. Wood-pulp Potential is defined as the number of unimproved acres of woodland and forests in county c in 1880. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. All columns include county and election year fixed effects and controls from Table 6. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

**Table 8: Addressing other potential sources of endogeneity of newspaper presence
Electoral strategies**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Model:</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>IV</i>	<i>Reduced Form</i>	<i>First Stage</i>
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable:</i>	Gerrymandering Index			Secret Ballot × Newspapers in 1888
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.6863*** (0.1862)	-1.6211*** (0.4182)	-0.0722 (0.1172)	2.8627*** (0.1043)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.2255*** (0.0640)	0.5479*** (0.1405)		
Secret Ballot NPO × (Wood-pulp potential)			-0.2197*** (0.0556)	-0.3969*** (0.0527)
Secret Ballot NPO × (Wood-pulp potential) ²			0.0359 (0.0449)	0.0440 (0.0440)
R-squared	0.0234	-	0.0265	0.938
F	309.4	-	4696	348.2
Observations	5,276	5,276	5,276	5,276
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable:</i>	Voter Intimidation			Secret Ballot × Newspapers in 1888
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.0103 (0.0303)	-0.0230 (0.0396)	-0.0232** (0.0106)	2.8945*** (0.1052)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	-0.0030 (0.0099)	0.0013 (0.0120)		
Secret Ballot NPO × (Wood-pulp potential)			-0.0009 (0.0044)	-0.3997*** (0.0562)
Secret Ballot NPO × (Wood-pulp potential) ²			0.0024 (0.0030)	0.0474 (0.0449)
R-squared	0.0192	-	0.0193	0.937
F	16.33	-	29.71	451.9
Observations	5,444	5,444	5,444	5,444

*Note: The unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period includes all the elections pre and post the first adoption of the secret ballot. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the district level. Wood-pulp Potential is defined as the number of unimproved acres of woodland and forests in district d in 1880. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. All columns include district and election year fixed effects and controls from Table 6. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Table 9: Southern counties had more concentrated media and lower literacy rates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable	Literacy in 1870	Newspapers 1888	County has at least two partisan outlets	Herfindahl Index based on number of newspapers	Herfindahl Index based on newspapers' circulation
South	-0.0634*** (0.0133)	-0.0542 (0.0408)	-0.4699*** (0.1014)	0.2092*** (0.0451)	0.1921*** (0.0444)
<i>Additional Covariates fixed at 1888:</i>					
- Total Population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % Population in Places with 2,500 or + inh.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % Population in Places with 25,000 or + inh.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % White population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- % Male population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- Manufacturing Output Per Capita	✓	✓	✓	✓	
- Farm Output Per Capita	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
- Foreign Born Population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,891	2,034	2,034	2,034	1,976
R-squared	0.7546	0.2531	0.5052	0.4808	0.4403

*Note: Cross-section of countries in 1888. South is a dummy variable equal to one for the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Table 10: Comparing the role of the media in South vs Non-South states

Dependent variable:	Voting Behavior						Electoral Strategies			
	Split ticket Voting		Turnout		Vote Share Dominant Party		Voter intimidation		Gerrymandering Index	
States in the sample:	South	Non-South	South	Non-South	South	Non-South	South	Non-South	South	Non-South
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.0190** (0.0085)	0.0256*** (0.0034)	-0.1774*** (0.0183)	-0.0533*** (0.0051)	0.0176 (0.0160)	-0.0207*** (0.0052)	-0.0218 (0.0443)	-0.0043 (0.0034)	-0.0972 (0.1618)	0.0443 (0.1175)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	-0.0768** (0.0315)	0.0725*** (0.0185)	-0.1545 (0.0939)	0.0625** (0.0250)	0.0547 (0.1123)	-0.0684*** (0.0184)	-0.0102 (0.0165)	-0.0003 (0.0009)	0.0757 (0.0690)	0.0804** (0.0382)
Observations	4,309	11,501	4,461	11,277	4,241	10,774	1,536	3,746	1,536	3,746
R-squared	0.2601	0.4080	0.7888	0.8015	0.6758	0.5260	0.1492	0.0913	0.7793	0.7469
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				
Congressional District Fixed Effects							✓	✓	✓	✓
Election Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-specific time trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The unit of observation in Columns 1 to 6 is a county-presidential-election-year, while in Columns 7 to 11, the unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period includes all the elections pre and post the first adoption of the secret ballot. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county or congressional district level. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

A Online Appendix - Not for publication

Figure A1: Cartoon, “The Gerry-Mander”, 1813
Origins of the word gerrymandering

Textually cited from [National Museum of American History \(n.d.\)](#): *The “Gerry-Mander” cartoon (above) first appeared in the Boston Gazette, March 26, 1812, and was quickly reprinted in Federalist newspapers in Salem (this copy is from the Salem Gazette from April 2, 1813) and Boston. The cartoon expressed opposition to state election districts newly redrawn by Massachusetts’ Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican Party, led by Governor Elbridge Gerry. Fearing that the Federalist Party would gain power in the 1812 election, Gerry consolidated Federalist voting strength in a salamander-shaped voting district. The practice – though not invented by Gerry – became known as a “gerrymandering”.*

Figure A2: An example of the state printed ballot

THIS BALLOT SHOULD BE MARKED IN ONE OF TWO WAYS WITH A PENCIL, HAVING BLACK LEAD.
 TO VOTE A STRAIGHT TICKET, MAKE A CROSS X MARK WITHIN THE CIRCLE ABOVE ONE OF THE PARTY COLUMNS.
 TO VOTE A SPLIT TICKET, THAT IS, FOR CANDIDATES OF DIFFERENT PARTIES, THE VOTER SHOULD MAKE A CROSS X MARK BEFORE THE NAME OF EACH CANDIDATE FOR WHOM HE VOTES.
 IF THE TICKET MARKED IN THE CIRCLE FOR A STRAIGHT TICKET DOES NOT CONTAIN THE NAMES OF CANDIDATES FOR ALL OFFICES FOR WHICH THE ELECTOR MAY VOTE, HE MAY VOTE FOR CANDIDATES FOR SUCH OFFICES SO OMITTED BY MAKING A CROSS X MARK BEFORE THE NAMES OF CANDIDATES FOR SUCH OFFICES ON ANOTHER TICKET, OR BY WRITING THE NAMES, IF THEY ARE NOT PRINTED UPON THE BALLOT, IN THE BLANK COLUMN UNDER THE TITLE OF THE OFFICE.
 TO VOTE FOR A PERSON NOT ON THE BALLOT, WRITE THE NAME OF SUCH PERSON, UNDER THE TITLE OF THE OFFICE, IN THE BLANK COLUMN.
 ANY OTHER MARK THAN THE CROSS X MARK USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF VOTING OR ANY LEADERS MADE ON THIS BALLOT MAKES IT VOID, AND NO VOTE CAN BE COUNTED HEREBY.
 IF YOU TEAR OR DEFACE, OR WRONGLY MARK THIS BALLOT, RETURN IT AND OBTAIN ANOTHER.

For a Straight Ticket Make Within This Circle	For a Straight Ticket Make Within This Circle	For a Straight Ticket Make Within This Circle	For a Straight Ticket Make Within This Circle	For a Straight Ticket Make Within This Circle	For a Straight Ticket Make Within This Circle	BLANK COLUMN. THE ELECTOR MAY WRITE IN THE COLUMNS BELOW, UNDER THE TITLE OF THE OFFICE, THE NAME OF ANY PERSON WHOSE NAME IS NOT PRINTED UPON THE BALLOT, FOR WHOM HE DESIRES TO VOTE.
REPUBLICAN TICKET. For President, WILLIAM MCKINLEY. For Vice-President, GARRET A. HOBART.	DEMOCRATIC TICKET. For President, WILLIAM J. BRYAN. For Vice-President, ARTHUR SEWALL.	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC TICKET. For President, JOHN M. PALMER. For Vice-President, SIMON B. BUCKNER.	PROHIBITION TICKET. For President, JOSHUA LEVERING. For Vice-President, HALE JOHNSON.	SOCIALISTIC-LABOR TICKET. For President, CHARLES H. MATCHETT. For Vice-President, MATTHEW MAGUIRE.	PEOPLE'S TICKET. For President, WILLIAM J. BRYAN. For Vice-President, THOMAS F. WATSON.	
For Elector of President and Vice-President, BENJAMIN F. TRACY.	For Elector of President and Vice-President, ROBERT P. RESE.	For Elector of President and Vice-President, OSWALD OTTENDORFF.	For Elector of President and Vice-President, FREDERICK F. WHEELER.	For Elector of President and Vice-President, GEORGE ARBESON.	For Elector of President and Vice-President, ROBERT T. RUSH.	
EDWARD H. BUTLER.	BENJAMIN WOOD.	THOMAS RAGON.	LOUIS ALBERT BARKS.	THOMAS J. MURPHY.	BENJAMIN WOOD.	
CARL S. BEEK.	JOHN P. MADDEN.	PATRICK J. GLEASON.	HENRY W. RANDALL.	ABRAHAM SHAPIRO.	JOHN F. MADDEN.	
ALEXANDER BOER.	ANDREW McLEAN.	GEORGE W. WINGATE.	FREDERICK G. SMITH.	CARL WENDELSTEIN.	ANDREW McLEAN.	
CHARLES A. MOORE.	JAMES BURRELL.	JAMES A. MURTHA, JR.	JAMES MEYER.	OTTO HATJE.	JAMES BURRELL.	
ROBERT A. SHARKEY.	SAMUEL S. WHITEHOUSE.	HENRY W. SHERRILL.	FRANK MAPES.	WALFRED F. OSBERG.	SAMUEL S. WHITEHOUSE.	
FRANCIS F. WILLIAMS.	MARTIN H. DEANE.	J. EDWARD SWANSTROM.	JOHN DEERY.	JACOB LAPEIRE.	MARTIN H. DEANE.	
WILLIAM NARON.	JOHN ENNIS.	JAMES J. STANTON.	JOHN DEEMER.	GEORGE S. SULLIVAN.	JOHN ENNIS.	
FREDERICK HALDY.	JOHN K. WALSH.	GEORGE J. GREENFIELD.	JAMES C. FERNALL.	JACOB FIMMER.	JOHN K. WALSH.	
NICHOLAS FISH.	WILLIAM MCM. SPEER.	EDWARD J. DUNPHY.	JOHN GLOVER.	LOUIS SCHNEIDER.	WILLIAM MCM. SPEER.	
HERMAN O. ARNOCK.	MICHAEL F. LYONS.	HENRY CAMPBELL.	GEORGE B. HILLARD.	JOSEPH SMITH.	MICHAEL F. LYONS.	
GEORGE R. DEANE.	JOHN JORDAN.	JOHN FENNELL.	JOHN THOMER.	JAMES MAGARVEY.	JOHN JORDAN.	
FRANCIS J. DRUMMOND.	MAURICE R. BLUMENTHAL.	GEORGE TUCKER HARRISON.	EMORY CUMMINGS.	JOSEPH H. SWEENEY.	MAURICE R. BLUMENTHAL.	
HENRY BURRELL.	WILLIAM RANDOLPH READE.					

Note: The 1896 Presidential ballot, with party columns and party circles to cast a straight party ticket. Source: Smithsonian Institution via: <http://americanhistory.si.edu/vote/reform.html>

Figure A3: Variable definition and possible stages of the electoral reform

Note: The figure shows the coding of the Secret Ballot with and without straight party ticket option in the case of California. Based on the periods highlighted with arrows, we defined three indicator variables: 1st Secret, Reversal and 2nd Secret.

Figure A4: Event study estimates for each measure of Gerrymandering

Note: Outcome variables are defined in Figure 1

Table A1: Results based on different measures of Gerrymandering

Dependent Variable:	Polsby Popper	Schwartzberg	Convex Hull	Reock	Gerrymandering Index
Secret Ballot NPO	0.0239* (0.0128)	0.0155 (0.0106)	0.0042 (0.0156)	0.0049 (0.0119)	0.0825 (0.1020)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.0208** (0.0101)	0.0184* (0.0094)	0.0194** (0.0085)	-0.0023 (0.0081)	0.1273** (0.0536)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO	0.0069 (0.0049)	0.0038 (0.0044)	0.0072 (0.0045)	0.0061 (0.0043)	0.0506 (0.0358)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	-0.0038 (0.0054)	-0.0027 (0.0061)	-0.0016 (0.0067)	-0.0027 (0.0074)	0.0506 (0.0611)
<i>Controlling using the interactions: (Secret Ballot NPO × Covariate)</i>					
<i>Where the covariate is:</i>					
- Total Population	x	✓	x	✓	x
- % Population in Places with 2,500 or + inh.	x	✓	x	✓	x
- % Population in Places with 25,000 or + inh.	x	✓	x	✓	x
- % White population	x	✓	x	✓	x
- % Male population	x	✓	x	✓	x
- Manufacturing Output Per Capita	x	✓	x	✓	x
- Farm Output Per Capita	x	✓	x	✓	x
- Foreign Born Population	x	✓	x	✓	x
District Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-specific time trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,282	5,282	5,282	5,282	5,282
R-squared	0.8040	0.8399	0.7189	0.6491	0.7680

Note: The unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period is pre and post the introduction of the first secret ballot. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year t with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county or congressional district level. Outcome variables are defined in Figure 1. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A2: The possible role of country or congressional district pre-conditions

Dependent Variable:	Voting Behavior						Electoral Strategies			
	Turnout		Split ticket voting		Vote Share Dominant Party		Voter Intimidation		Gerrymandering Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Secret Ballot NPO	-0.094*** (0.034)	-0.095** (0.037)	0.016 (0.013)	0.024* (0.012)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	0.036 (0.089)	0.034 (0.087)
Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.093** (0.043)	0.072** (0.032)	0.063*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.020)	-0.063** (0.030)	-0.052* (0.029)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.078*** (0.027)	0.070** (0.034)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.010 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.046 (0.033)	0.046 (0.032)
Pre Secret Ballot NPO × Newspapers in 1888	0.051 (0.073)	0.053 (0.067)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.000 (0.033)	-0.004 (0.068)	0.004 (0.067)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.012 (0.026)	0.007 (0.027)
Avg. dependent variable from 1880 to 1888 _c × <i>t</i>	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	x	x	x
Congressional District Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State-specific time trends	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	15,738	15,738	15,810	15,810	15,015	15,015	5,282	5,282	5,282	5,282
R-squared	0.841	0.854	0.349	0.399	0.615	0.619	0.114	0.114	0.766	0.766

*Note: The unit of observation in Columns 1 to 6 is a county-presidential-election-year, while in Columns 7 to 10, the unit of observation is a district-congressional-election-year. The sample period includes all the elections pre and post the first adoption of the secret ballot. Secret Ballot NPO is a dummy variable that is one when the state has adopted the voting secrecy at year *t* with a paper ballot that does not allow for a straight party ticket option. Newspapers in 1888 refers to the total number of daily and weekly newspapers per thousand population registered by 1888 at the county or congressional district level. Outcome variables are defined in section 4.2. Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

Table A3: Alternative interpretations and newspapers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Dependent Variable	Newspapers per thousand population in 1888															
Total Population	-0.0000*** (0.0000)	-0.0000*** (0.0000)														
% Population in Places with 2,500 or + inhabitants			-0.0012 (0.0007)	-0.0013** (0.0006)												
% Population in Places with 25,000 or + inhabitants					-0.0019*** (0.0005)	-0.0016*** (0.0004)										
% White population							0.0028*** (0.0007)	0.0012* (0.0006)								
% Male population									0.0288*** (0.0058)	0.0219*** (0.0053)						
Manufacturing Output Per Capita											-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0003* (0.0002)				
Farm Output Per Capita													0.0010** (0.0004)	-0.0005 (0.0005)		
Foreign Born Population															-0.0000* (0.0000)	-0.0000*** (0.0000)
R-squared	0.0695	0.3692	0.0075	0.3532	0.0062	0.3501	0.0651	0.3497	0.1927	0.3821	0.0076	0.3473	0.0125	0.3363	0.0058	0.3576

Note: Cross-section of countries in 1888. All columns include state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$